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1Introduction
On April 22, 2002, the Boston Globe reported that doctors had begun the process of identifying patients
who may have been sold diluted drugs by Kansas City, Missouri pharmacist Robert Courtney.1In February,
2002, Courtney pleaded guilty to 20 counts of “tampering and adulterating or misbranding” two popular
chemotherapy drugs; prosecutors believe he actually may have watered down 72 types of medicines prescribed
for 4,200 patients in the past ten years. With every diluted dose, Courtney made “hundreds of dollars,”
enough in the long run to enable him to pay $600,000 dollars in taxes, and to donate $1,000,000 to his
church. Today, Courtney sits in a Missouri jail, as he will for the next 17 to 30 years.
Robert Courtney is certainly not the ﬁrst person to try to make money by adulterating drugs. Indeed, drug
adulteration has been a problem since time immemorial, and nations all over the world have struggled to
control it.2Here in the United States, the federal government made its ﬁrst attempt to solve the problem
of adulterated drugs with the passage of the Import Drugs Act (or the “Act”) in June, 1848.3 The Act
provided that the United States Customs Service would examine all imported drugs for purity, quality, and
strength before allowing them into the United States. If the drugs did not meet the prescribed standard,
they would be condemned or re-exported.
The Import Drugs Act has been relatively ignored by the academic community, and is most often relegated to
a passing reference in a footnote. Yet the Act represents an important step in our nation’s creation of a safe
1Josh Freed, Doctors Start Tally of Patients Given Watered-Down Drugs: Pharmacist Jailed for Role in Scheme, Boston
Globe, April 22, 2002, at A3.
2In this paper, I use the term adulteration to mean “any procedure that produces an alteration in strength or purity or both,
from the [declared] standard of the drug, whether through intent or neglect.” See Ernst W. Stieb, Drug Control in Britain,
1850-1914, in Safeguarding the Public: Historical Aspects of Medicinal Drug Control, 15, (John B. Blake ed., 1970).
3Import Drugs Act, 9 Stat. 237 (1848).
2supply of drugs, and thus deserves some attention. In this paper, I give the Act that attention, and seek to
place it in an historical context. In Chapter 1, I describe how Congressional action was prompted by medical
conditions during the Mexican War and the belief that American soldiers were being given adulterated drugs.
Chapter 2 describes the involvement of the professional health organizations in the ﬁght against adulterated
drugs, and suggests reasons why drug adulteration posed such a problem to doctors and pharmacists. In
Chapter 3, I look at the legislative history of the Act, through an analysis of the House Report and the
Congressional debates on the matter. Finally, in Chapter 4, I look at the mechanics of how the Act was
implemented by the Customs Service, and describe its short term eﬀects on the problem of adulterated drugs.
3Chapter 1:
Drug Adulteration and the Mexican War
The Import Drugs Act of 1848 was no doubt prompted in part by the medical conditions American soldiers
faced during the Mexican War. The Mexican War ran from 1846 until 1848, and concluded with the
ratiﬁcation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo a few months before the signing of the Import Drugs Act.4The
end of the war dominated the Congressional agenda during the entire time the Import Drugs Act was under
consideration. In its report (the “Committee Report”) to Congress on the Import Drugs Act, the Select
Committee on the Importation of Drugs (the “Committee”) had noted its surprise “at the herculean portions
of active medicines prescribed” by the army doctors.5At ﬁrst, the Committee “w[as] disposed to trace many
of these prescriptions to peculiarity of climate and endemic disease.”6Their ﬁnal conclusion, however, and a
catalyst for the legislation, was that “the adulteration of the medicines used accounts for and fully justiﬁes
these seemingly extravagant prescriptions, and also explains the lamentable mortality attendant upon our
troops.”7During the Congressional debates on the Act, several Congressmen made reference to the poor
4The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed on January 31, 1848; ratiﬁed by the United States Senate on March 10,
1848; and ratiﬁed by the Mexican government on March 30, 1848. See James M. McCaﬀrey, Army of Manifest Destiny: The
American Soldier in the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (1992) [hereinafter Army of Manifest Destiny].
5H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 20 (1848). The standard dosage of pure quinine was “a few grains.” See id. at 7. The “herculean
portions” described by Congress likely refer to dosages such as the twenty grains of quinine one doctor reported giving a soldier.
See Dr. Thomas Neely Love, A Southern Lacrimosa: the Mexican War Journal of Dr. Thomas Neely Love, Surgeon 263 (H.
Grady Howell, Jr. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Lacrimosa].
6H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 20.
7The full text of the Committee Report’s discussion on adulterated drugs in the Mexican War is as follows:
“The reports of every day are ﬁlled with death. The gallant troops now in Mexico have dwindled frightfully before the
diseases of that climate. That army possesses in its own tried valor an eﬀectual element of protection from the present or any
future enemy. It does not ask our protection from the foe; for this it looks to God and its won right arm; but “the arrow that
ﬂyeth at noonday, and the pestilence that walketh in darkness,” are beyond their vigilance and prowess. Your committee, by
frequent conversations with the surgeons in attendance upon our troops there, have been surprised at the herculean portions
4quality of drugs the American soldiers had received on the Mexican warfront. Congressman Hunt stated in
the House debate on June 2, 1848, that “the importation of deleterious drugs had been very injurious to our
army during the war with Mexico, and hence some action on this subject was loudly demanded.”8Making
this mistake right with the families of the dead soldiers was certainly a motivating force in passing the Act.
In this chapter, I examine the claim that adulterated drugs were to blame for the high number of army
deaths in the Mexican War. I also look at how Congress was able to use the Import Drugs Act as a salve
for the pain and anger that American families may have felt over the Mexican War deaths. Ultimately,
Congress may have been too willing to place the blame for soldiers’ deaths on foreign adulterated drugs.
The lack of funding for good doctors and adequate sanitary conditions, as well as the soldiers’ own refusal
to follow the sanitary regulations the army did have, likely contributed to the high number of deaths from
disease—probably moreso than any adulterated drugs. Moreover, medical science was in such a primitive
state that even fully potent drugs would have been ineﬀective against the soldiers’ illnesses. In this chapter,
I argue that blaming the deaths of American men on foreign adulterated drugs provided a handy explanation
for Congress as the nation emerged from a controversial war. When a nation goes to war, its citizens expect
to lose lives on the battleﬁeld, but do not expect lives to be wasted in army camp epidemics. Blaming
American soldiers’ deaths on foreign drugs oﬀered a way to unify a nation that was already split over the
war, and was beginning to splinter over issues such as slavery and women’s rights.9
of active medicines prescribed in many forms of illness. They were at ﬁrst disposed to trace many of these prescriptions to
peculiarity of climate and endemic disease. But the adulteration of the medicines used accounts for and fully justiﬁes these
seemingly extravagant prescriptions, and also explains the lamentable mortality attendant upon our troops. We are not aware
of the existence of a law requiring inspection of drugs and medicine purchase for the army or navy. We believe no inspection
is had in this department; and whilst a rigid examination of material for clothing and subsistence is demanded, the sick and
wounded are left to him who furnishes agents necessary for their comfort and recovery, as the lowest bidder. We deem this a
dangerous proceeding, and one imperiously demanding legislation.” Id. at 20..
8Cong. Globe, 30th Cong. 1st Sess., 810 (1848).
9For a discussion of the social history of the United States during the Mexican War, see generally, Expansionism and
Conﬂict.
5Though the United States won the war with Mexico, the two-year ﬁght exacted a heavy toll on the American
forces. Around 12,500 men were lost in the two years of the war; Congress would receive frequent news of
more American deaths, as would the families and communities of the dead soldiers.10As the Committee
Report noted, “the reports of every day are ﬁlled with death.”11Most often, though, the news was not that
the soldiers had died in combat, but instead that the men had died of disease while at the front. The
committee acknowledged in its report that “the number of our troops in Mexico who have perished in battle
bears no proportion to those who have fallen victims to the climate and the exposure consequent on army
life.”12Indeed, during the two years of the war, almost 10,790 American soldiers died from disease, while
less than 1,548 died in combat.13This sorry statistic made the Mexican War “the deadliest war the United
States ever fought.”14
Congress Underfunds the War-Eﬀort
One of the primary reasons that so many soldiers died of disease was that Congress was a poor provider
for the welfare of American soldiers. There simply was not enough funding to provide for healthy living
conditions on the warfront. For example, Congress failed to appropriate funds to ensure that soldiers had
10See id. at 190.
11H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 20.
12Id. at 20.
13Thomas R. Irey, Soldiering, Suﬀering, and Dying in the Mexican War, XI Journal of the West 285 (1972) [hereinafter
Soldiering, Suﬀering, and Dying] (citing statistics from S. Exec. Doc. No. 34-96, at 605-606.). See also James McCaﬀrey,
Santa Anna’s Greatest Weapon: The Eﬀect of Disease on the American Soldier During the Mexican War, Military History of
the West, Fall 1994, at 111 [hereinafter Santa Anna’s Greatest Weapon].
14Soldiering, Suﬀering and Dying at 285. The article compares the mortality rate of disease of the Mexican War to the Civil
War, the Spanish-American War, World War I. The mortality rate of disease for each of the wars was as follows: Mexican
War—110 per 1,000 per annum; Civil War—65 per 1,000 per annum; Spanish-American War—27.79 per 1,000 per annum;
World War I—16 per 1,000 per annum. See id.
6proper clothing to protect against the elements.15The government provided very few of its soldiers with
“wollen [sic] clothes and hardly one in ten with ﬂannel.”16During the winter, soldiers slept in “paper-thin
government issue tents” designed for hot summers.17One army doctor lamented that, “[o]ur sick men suﬀered
very much from the want of [b]lankets & mattresses to keep them warm.”18Soldiers also ran short of food,
and what they had either lacked nutrition or was downright dangerous. At one camp on the Rio Grande,
the soldiers existed on a diet of beans, pickled pork, ﬂour, and “bug-infested biscuits.”19Government funding
was so short that one doctor described lending “the government” twenty dollars to pay the rail fare for
some sick soldiers.20In the end, he had such a hard time getting reimbursed that he regretted lending the
money in the ﬁrst place.21Sick troops refused to go from their camps to military hospitals because “they
would not be attended to, and nothing given them to eat.”22One sick soldier remarked “that it was only
twenty ﬁve cents between that and going to Hell, and that he would prefer going to Hell.”23According to
one doctor, “not until the seal of death had ﬁxed the destiny of many a brave soldier, did our Government
oﬃcers pretend to oﬀer the least assistance.”24 Congress also skimped on funding for medical supplies. Army
doctors experienced frequent shortages of medicines when cargo aboard ships sank en route, or was raided
15Id. at 297.
16Lacrimosa at 255.
17Soldiering, Suﬀering, and Dying at 287.
18Lacrimosa at 81.
19Soldiering, Suﬀering, and Dying at 289.
20Lacrimosa at 35.
21Id.
22Id.
23Id.
24Id.at 257.
7by bandits.25A Dr. John B. Porter, stationed in Monterey, Mexico, ran through his supply of drugs while
awaiting a new shipment:
So long as our quinine held out, there was no diﬃculty in managing the fevers,...pulv.
cinchona did very well as long as it lasted, but this gave out, and we then resorted
to serpentaria Virginiana and other bitters. When these gave out, we took to sul-
phate of zinc and myrrh, sometimes with, and sometimes without opium...But the
sulphate of zinc gave out, and I was obliged to resort, very unwillingly, to the use of
arsenic...Fortunately, the opening of communication with the depots at Camargo and
Matamoros, and the arrival of a supply of quinine and other medicines and stores,
rendered it unnecessary to continue the use of a dangerous remedy.26
Clearly, the army doctors had to be extremely resourceful, as it was uncertain whether they would have the
drugs necessary to treat their patients. Army doctors had very little control over the quality of care they
gave to soldiers when the army did not supply them with medicines or the means to run sanitary facilities.
One doctor noted that, “[o]f all places I ever undertook to give medicine this [the warfront] was the worst.
No one to nurse—not a spoon to give medicine with, hardly a tin cup to be found—not a scrap of cloth to
make even a mustard plaster.”27The doctors’ lack of necessary medical supplies can be traced directly back
to a lack of funding by Congress.
Even when the army doctors made speciﬁc requests for medicines, they often could not obtain what they
needed to treat patients. Army oﬃcers were constrained by small budgets, so rationed out available drugs
in small amounts. One doctor described his experience with requesting medicines he needed for his patients:
25Santa Anna’s Greatest Weapon at 120. Doctors in the Mexican War carried medicines such as quinine, calomel, laudanum,
tincture of cayem pepper, spirits of camphor, essence of peppermint, and Hoﬀman’s anodyne. See Soldiering, Suﬀering, and
Dying at 297. The article notes that a full list of medicines Mexican War doctors carried is available at “Claim of Dr. A.
Wislezenus for medical supply payment,” H.R. Rep. No. 30-404, at 3-4.
27Lacrimosa at 36.
8“I found the stock of medicines exceedingly scanty—the assortment very poor...the
government had not given us half medicines enough, and nothing like a full assortment.
I wrote for Cay[e]nne pepper, syrup of squills, ginger, sage, and some other articles
which they had not furnished at all. They did not send them...I had a talk afterwards
with Dr. McCormick who told me that if he could, he would allow all the articles,
that he knew they were necessary. He advised me to get more quinine and treat those
cases with large doses. We went to Dr. Lawson (the surgeon Genl.)—Dr. McCormick
said that I ought to have some more quinine at least. He hemmed and hawed and
replied—“Well, well, let him have an ounce.” Then Dr. told him that I wanted half
a dozen ounces—The Old surgeon Genl. paused and said, “Well, let him have it.” As
I walked oﬀ I thought he would rather save ﬁve dollars for the government than save
a poor Soldier’s life.”28
If statements such as these reached the American public, Congress would face a lot of angry constituents.
Valuing the bottom line over soldiers’ lives was not the image that the government wanted to convey. The
ﬂowery language used in the Committee Report to describe the bravery of the troops demonstrated that
Congress wanted to be viewed as strongly supportive of the soldiers who fought for America.29 In its report,
the Committee also referred to Congress’s duty to protect its soldiers—failing to provide adequate funds for
medical supplies was surely not a fulﬁllment of that duty.30
To exacerbate matters further, there were a large number of unqualiﬁed people providing medical treatment
to troops during the Mexican War. There is historical dispute over whether the army doctors themselves
were well- or poorly- qualiﬁed.31The army doctors did have to pass a fairly rigorous exam before being hired,
and the high failure rate for the exam likely indicates that the exam was successful at weeding out the
worst physicians.32However, soldiers received medical treatment from a large number of people who did not
have to pass the entrance exam. In Vera Cruz, for instance, there were not enough army doctors available
29See supra note 7 for the relevant text of the Committee Report. See also, infra p. 36 for a discussion of the Committee’s
appeal to Congress’ patriotism.
30See supra note 7.
31See Expansionism and Conﬂict at 191. For a discussion of medical education at the time of the Mexican War, see infra
pp. 17-19, which describe the low standards many medical schools had for both admission and graduation.
32Army of Manifest Destiny at 55.
9to treat the number of sick soldiers. To remedy this, the army recruited “mere hacks from the streets of
New Orleans or from the civilian populace of Veracruz itself.”33The assistants to the army doctors, such as
orderlies and nurses, were even less competent. Most often, the doctors pulled their assistants from among
the soldiers.34The soldiers that the commanding oﬃcers were willing to spare for medical duty were usually
the most incompetent or the most insubordinate.35A Dr. Love described his experience with the soldiers he
asked to assist him:
When I came to see the patients, the nurses to whom I had given the directions were
not to be found—I could not tell how the patient rested—what medicine he had
taken, or in fact anything deﬁnite about him—the nurses generally were ignorant
about giving medicine—Many of the menial duties I performed myself or had to let
them go undone.36
With the few army doctors left to do everything on their own, it is small wonder poor medical treatment
occurred. As Love’s commentary makes clear, not only were the doctors unaided by assistants, but their work
was often undermined. Clearly, there was a need for additional medical personnel, which greater funding
could have provided.
The Primitive State of Medicine During the Mexican War
Medical science was still at quite a primitive level at the time of the Mexican War, and remained so even
33James M. McCaﬀrey, “Surrounded by Dangers of All Kinds: The Mexican War Letters of Lieutenant Theodore Laidley 64
(1997) [hereinafter Surrounded by Dangers].
34Id.
35Id.
10through the Civil War.37Indeed, as discussed in the next chapter, almost all the medicines that the doctors
were using to treat disease have since been removed from the United States Pharmacopoeia because of their
uselessness in treating disease.38In this section, I argue that the unadvanced state of medicine, in addition
to the poor living conditions created by Congressional underfunding, contributed much more to the number
of American Mexican War deaths than any adulterated drugs did.
Conditions in Mexico caused many diseases amongst the American troops, but none was as feared as yellow
fever, or “yellow jack.”39Worry about the disease determined military strategy in many instances, includ-
ing General Winﬁeld Scott’s decision to delay the occupation of Vera Cruz until the yellow fever season
had passed.40Yellow jack was “an extremely infectious disease...characterized by high temperature, chills,
headache, and pain in the arms, legs, and back, vomiting, and constipation.”41As the disease progressed,
there was “reduced excretion of bile, with consequent yellowing of the skin” (hence the name “yellow” fever),
followed by “internal hemorrhaging [that] cause[d] blood in the vomit.” 42Thediseasewasoftenfatal.43At the
time of the Mexican War, no one was certain what caused yellow fever, or how it was transmitted, so the
army doctors tried to prevent it by telling troops to do everything from avoiding overindulgence in food and
37See Expansionism and Conﬂict at 191-192.
38See infra pp. 19-20 for additional discussion on the topic.
39Yellow jack was not the only disease suﬀered by American troops—it was not even the greatest killer. Soldiers suﬀered and
died from diarrhea, dysentery, catarrh, small-pox, and cholera as well. See Soldiering, Suﬀering, and Dying at 286. Additional
diseases that plagued the troops were typhoid fever, measles, mumps, tuberculosis, and dysentery. See Expansionism and
Conﬂict at 190-191.
40Roger G. Miller, Yellow Jack at Vera Cruz, Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives, Spring 1978, 43, at 46
[hereinafter Yellow Jack].
41Id. at 44.
42Id.
43Id.
11drink to staying out of the sun. 44A common belief was that the disease was transmitted from harmful vapors
from decaying animal or vegetable matter, or the “miasmas” of a swampy climate.45The medical community
did not discover until years later that the disease was actually transmitted by mosquitoes.46 Quinine was the
drug of choice to treat yellow fever, and it was most likely adulterated quinine that Congress latched onto as
a reason for the Import Drugs Act. The army doctors “put their entire faith in treating yellow fever victims
with quinine, and went so far as to claim that if the drug failed, the patient might as well have his coﬃn
prepared.”47A suspected yellow fever patient would receive a warm mustard bath, heavy doses of quinine,
mustard plasters, and was sometimes bled through the use of leeches or local cupping.48In later stages of the
disease, some physicians prescribed calomel (mercury chloride) to reduce nausea and vomiting.49Though the
physicians of the time did not know it, quinine did not have any eﬀect on yellow fever.50Thus, the “herculean
doses” that convinced Congress that the drug must have been adulterated were a false clue. Even quinine of
the highest quality and 100 percent strength would have failed to cure these soldiers. For Congress and the
medical profession, however, the adulteration of quinine provided a palatable reason for its ineﬀectiveness.
“Cold plague” was another camp disease that foiled doctors’ expectations. Later suspected to be a type of
meningitis, the disease did not respond to any of the medical treatments doctors threw at it.51A Dr. Love
wrote of his frustration in treating the ailment: “I invoked the aid of all I had learned from books or medical
44Id. at 45.
45See Army of Manifest Destiny, at 62.
46See Yellow Jack, at 53.
47Id. at 50.
48Id.
49Id.
50Id.
51See Lacrimosa, at 270.
12teachers, but found it unavailing. I used depletion, emetics and cathartics in vain. Sometimes large doses
of quinine seemed indispensable, but these were injurious instead of beneﬁcial.”52Every skill that medicine
could teach Dr. Love was useless in his ﬁght against this disease; he calculated that of the original 885
members of the 2d Mississippi Riﬂes, 97 died from the “cold plague,” while 70 total died from all other
diseases combined.53Medical knowledge of the time in many cases could not help doctors help their patients.
The high mortality rate from disease was also caused by the soldiers’ own actions and the lack of medical
knowledge regarding sanitation. Doctors used the same medical instruments on multiple patients without
any sterilization between patients.54The soldiers, however, created conditions of ﬁlth within the camps for
which the government cannot be blamed. The United States Army ﬁghting in the Mexican War was made
up of volunteers and “regulars.” “Regulars” belonged to the army before the war began, and were used
to living in camp conditions. The volunteers enlisted after the start of the war, and had not yet learned
how to live healthily in army camps. This diﬀerence was borne out by the substantially higher death rate
for volunteers.55With many of them living away from home for the ﬁrst time, the volunteers exhibited “an
almost total disregard for their own cleanliness.”56One soldier wrote home from Vera Cruz that “sickness
of some kinds, fevers or the disease of the country, is pretty common and becoming more so every day.
The volunteers not knowing how to take care of them, thus suﬀer the most and deaths among them are
becoming more common.”57The volunteers were often too lazy to obtain their drinking water upstream from
52Id. at 267.
53Id. at 269.
54See Expansionism and Conﬂict, at 191-192.
55See Soldiering, Suﬀering, and Dying, at 295. The mortality rate for the regulars was 76.8 per 1,000 per annum; the
mortality rate for volunteers was 103.2 per 1,000 per annum; and the mortality rate for “new and inexperienced regulars” was
148.8 per 1,000 per annum. Id.
56Santa Anna’s Greatest Weapon, at 113.
57Surrounded by Dangers of All Kinds, at 62.
13where they urinated, defecated, or bathed, which resulted in epidemics of cholera and dysentery within the
camps.58One army doctor wrote that he treated many patients “who probably have not washed their persons
for months, and who for weeks have not changed their underclothes, and who are not only ﬁlthy but covered
with vermin.”59
Political Ramiﬁcations of the High Number of Soldier Deaths
News of such horriﬁc camp conditions and the poor medical care provided to soldiers stood to enrage any
member of the American public—especially members of the public whose father, son, husband, or brother
had lost his life to disease in the war. Letters home from soldiers were the most descriptive of the army’s
plight: “the people of the States have no idea of the amount of sickness and deaths there are here in the
Army—arising from imprudence and exposure.”60The potential political consequences for needless deaths
were high. They were even higher when many of the deaths were caused by Congressional failure to provide
necessary resources to the soldiers. Congress had no power over the state of medical science at the time, but
it could control the quality of food and clothing its soldiers received, as well as the number of doctors and
the quantity of medical supplies it made available. Congress controlled the purse-strings of the military, and
the tighter it held them, the worse conditions were for the soldiers. As Congress was also in the position
of having to justify the need for ﬁghting the war, the pressure was on to explain why so many soldiers had
58Santa Anna’s Greatest Weapon at 112-113.
59Id. at 113 (citing “Report of Dr. R.S. Satterlee”, 5 July 1847, in Harvey E. Brown, The Medical Department of the United
States Army from 1775 to 1873 (Washington, DC: Surgeon-General’s Oﬃce, 1873) 187.)
60Surrounded by Dangers at 114.
14died.61
Against this backdrop, Congress passed the Import Drugs Act. With one sentence, the House Report
neatly blamed the vast number of war deaths from disease on foreign adulterated drugs. According to the
Committee, “the adulteration of the medicines used...explains the lamentable mortality attendant upon our
troops.”62Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, adulterated medicines do not explain the high mortality rate
of American troops: Congressional underfunding and primitive medical care do. Citing foreign adulterated
drugs as the cause of the high mortality rate allowed Congress to shift all blame from itself and army doctors.
In the end, Congress found it much better to blame a foreign source for unnecessary deaths than to accept
the blame itself.
61For a discussion of how the Mexican War split the country, see generally, North America Divided: War with Mexico,
1846-1848 (Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk eds. 1971).
62H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 20.
15Chapter 2:
The Professional Health Organizations
and the Problem of Adulterated Drugs
In the 1840’s, the medical community of doctors and pharmacists were united in a ﬁght against the adul-
teration of drugs. Adulterated drugs posed a problem for these professions because they had the potential
to damage reputations—if the drug a doctor gave a patient proved useless against illness, the patient would
have no faith in the doctor. As the traditional (allopathic) practice of medicine was competing against a
number of strong alternative forms of medicine, maintaining a strong professional reputation was important.
Both the medical and pharmacy professions took concrete actions to ﬁght adulterated drugs. In the end,
however, the primitive state of medical and pharmaceutical sciences may have been more to blame for the
professions’ poor reputations than any adulterated drugs were.
Problems of the Traditional Health Professions
During the 1840s, “the American medical profession was experiencing not only a diminished public conﬁdence
but also doubts within itself.”63In the face of these doubts, physicians from around the country joined together
63Lester S. King, Transformations in American Medicine: from Benjamin Rush to William Osler, 195 (1991) [hereinafter
Transformations in Medicine].
16with the hope of strengthening their profession.64Many physicians felt that the state of medical education
was hindering more than helping the profession. Thus, one of the ﬁrst things on the agenda of the American
Medical Association (the “AMA”) was the improvement of medical education. At its organizational meeting
in May, 1846, two of the proposals presented dealt speciﬁcally with improving medical education. The ﬁrst
proposal noted, “that it is desirable that a uniform and elevated standard of requirements for the degree
of M.D. should be adopted by all the medical schools in the United States.”65The second urged “that it
is desirable that young men, before being received as students of medicine should have acquired a suitable
preliminary education.”66At the ﬁrst annual meeting of the American Medical Association, the convention
voted to recommend that men could not be accepted as medical students unless there was evidence that they
“[we]re of good moral character” and had knowledge of subjects such as English, philosophy, basic math
(including geometry and algebra), and enough mastery of Latin and Greek so that they could understand
the technical language of medicine.67This resolution was adopted over protest that this would prevent poor,
yet smart, men from becoming doctors; the protest was defeated by the argument that there were free
public schools available so that all could master these basic subjects.68 It was quite clear to almost everyone
that medical education needed improvement. Indeed, “few states had any licensing requirements, and the
majority of practicing physicians never graduated from medical school.”69Medical schools required students
to complete two terms of lectures, but many students were able to complete this requirement despite starting
64The American Medical Association was founded in 1846, and held its ﬁrst Annual Meeting in May, 1848. See generally,
Morris Fishbein, History of the American Medical Association (1947) [hereinafter History of the AMA].
65History of the AMA at 25.
66Id.
67Id. at 28.
68Id. at 28-29.
69Expansionism and Conﬂict, at 191.
17the term late or failing to attend all the classes.70Students may have been such poor attendees of their
classes because the two lecture terms they had to complete oﬀered the identical set of lectures—not further
coursework.71The ﬁnal exams at the medical schools were not necessarily diﬃcult to pass.72Indeed, in order
to fund their schools through tuition moneys, the medical schools sought to attract students “by shortening
of the curriculum and by the establishment of easy terms of graduation.”73 The most productive part of a
medical education in the 1840’s was a student’s apprenticeship with a practicing doctor. In the ﬁrst half
of the apprenticeship, the student would study “anatomy, chemistry, botany, physiology, drugs and their
actions, pharmacy, and clinical medicine.”74The student would assist the doctor with small tasks such as
ﬁlling prescriptions, bloodletting, or dressing wounds.75In the second half of the apprenticeship, the student
would go with the physician on patient calls, or assist in surgery.76At the conclusion of this, the student
became certiﬁed to practice medicine.
The fact that under such a system practically anyone could become a doctor—regardless of intellect or
skill—did much to harm the reputations of doctors. Also damaging to their reputations, however, was the
fact that most of the time, their advice and prescriptions simply did not work. It was extremely important
70The length of a term was generally sixteen weeks, though some schools reduced it to thirteen. See History of the AMA, at
21.
71Id.
72Army of Manifest Destiny, at 54. One doctor said that anyone could pass the exam as long as they had paid their teachers.
Id.
73History of the AMA at 21.
74Army of Manifest Destiny, at 54.
75Id.
76Id.
18to a physician’s reputation that he actually was able to heal people. Unfortunately, the arsenal of medicines
available to physicians in the 1840’s was not very powerful. Of all the drugs appearing in the U.S. Pharma-
copoeia at the time, less than a dozen are considered “reliable and eﬀective pharmaceutical preparations”
by today’s standards.77Drugs still considered to be eﬀective include quinine, morphine, digitalis, diphtheria
antitoxin, aspirin, and ether.78The rest of the two hundred or so drugs on the list have either no eﬀect or
give only a small beneﬁt.79Of course, the doctors of the time had not way of knowing that the drugs they
had been taught to use were virtually worthless. But, this fact surely did not improve their rate of success
in treating patients.
In the 1840’s, mainstream medicine was also receiving competition from sects such as homeopathy, Thom-
sonianism, and hydropathy.80These schools of medicine actively went after patients of allopathic physicians,
and indeed, “regular physicians as a class did not have much better therapeutic results than did [the doctors
following untraditional methods].”81In addition to the poor cure rates of allopathic physicians, the public
viewed the remedies of traditional medicine as extreme, especially bloodletting and the “heroic draughts”
administered to patients. ers.”82As sectarian practitioners gained patients and believers, allopathic physi-
cians lost them. This was hard for the allopathic physicians to swallow, as they were losing not only their
reputations, but also the income these patients represented.83 Perhaps in response to this loss of business,
77Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States 24 (1980) [hereinafter Taking Your Medicine].
For more information on the U.S. Pharmacopoeia, see infra note 191.
78Id. at 24.
79Id.
80See generally, Lester S. King, American Medicine Comes of Age: 1840-1920, 9-12 (1983).
81Transformations in Medicine, at 195.
82Transformations in Medicine, at 196.
83Id.at 195.
19the Committee on Medical Education had decided by the ﬁrst annual meeting of the AMA that the United
States had too many doctors. To remedy this, it suggested that private physicians taking apprentices should
be more selective in choosing their students.84The Committee blamed the increased incidence of “quackery
and charlatanism” on the overabundance of doctors, and saw limiting access to the profession as a solution
to this problem.85Decreasing the number of doctors and limiting admittance to the profession would have
the eﬀect of increasing its prestige. It would also make access to medical treatment a scarcer resource, and
allow doctors to charge more for their services, much like professions such as lawyers and accountants are
able to.
The Threat of Adulterated Drugs
With all of these pre-existing threats to its reputation, the medical profession certainly did not need the
reputational damage that adulterated drugs promised to inﬂict. In the 1840’s, establishing a strong repu-
tation for the vocation was essential, and a strong reputation would be built only on success in treatment.
Adulterated drugs posed a great threat to the reputation of the medical profession: if patients did not re-
cover from their illnesses because of inert drugs—or worse, were made even sicker by a contaminant within
a drug—the prescribing physicians would be seen as incompetent. A letter to the editor of The Lancet, a
prominent London medical journal spelled out this fear: “it is still more severe upon the physician or sur-
geon, who prescribes an important remedy, upon the success of which his reputation may depend, and whose
84History of the AMA, at 45.
85Id.at 46.
20eﬀorts are foiled by the substitution of something useless, or even injurious.”86 Prescribing or selling
adulterated drugs could certainly create a tainted reputation. As described earlier, such a poor reputation
harmed physicians economically as well, as failure by traditional practitioners could drive patients to seek
cures from nontraditional doctors and “quacks.” Fewer patients yielded fewer fees for doctors. Thus, it was
vital to both pharmacists and doctors that they be respected. Indeed, within the Code of Ethics Adopted by
the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy (the “Ethics Code”), apothecaries were told to correct errors made by
physicians in their prescriptions, “if possible, without knowledge of the patient, so that the physician may be
screened from censure.”87This code indicated an attitude of mutual protection among the health professions,
rather than a competitiveness—whether this attitude was better for the patients served is less clear.88
The Professional Organizations Take Action
Thus, adulterated drugs posed a substantial problem to the traditional health professions, and as the profes-
sional health organizations took shape, they looked for ways to solve the problem. The Philadelphia College
of Pharmacy, a well-respected professional organization, attacked the problem through its Ethics Code. Un-
der the Ethics Code, apothecaries were forbidden from intentionally selling “impure drugs or medicines, from
86A Mortar, Mr. Mortar on the Adulteration of Drugs to the editor of The Lancet, The Lancet, Feb. 8, 1851 at 172.
87Code of Ethics Adopted by the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, 5th Tenet (emphasis added) [hereinafter Ethics Code].
88There was much greater overlap between the professions than there is today, so it is unsurprising that the groups united
here. For instance, prescriptions were not nearly as restrictive as they are today. A patient did not need to go to a doctor to
get a prescription for a certain drug—he could go directly to the pharmacist or apothecary, who gave him whatever drug he
asked for. Patients could also obtain drugs by purchasing them directly from doctors, many of whom sold drugs to patients
instead of writing a prescription for a druggist or apothecary to ﬁll. Thus, the lines between pharmacists and physicians were
unclear, and patients had practically unfettered access to any drug they chose. See Taking Your Medicine at 23.
21motives of competition, or desire of gain, when pure articles of the same kind may be obtained.”89The full
ethical tenet read:
7th. As the apothecary should be able to distinguish between good
and bad drugs, in most cases, and as the substitution of a weak or
inert drug for an active one, may, negatively, be productive of seri-
ous consequences—we hold that the intentional sale of impure drugs or
medicines, from motives of competition, or desire of gain, when pure ar-
ticles of the same kind may be obtained, is highly culpable, and that it
is the duty of every honest apothecary or druggist to expose all such
fraudulent acts as may come to his knowledge. But in reference to those
drugs which cannot be obtained in a state of purity, he should, as occa-
sion oﬀers, keep physicians informed of their quality, that they may be
governed accordingly.
Through this ethical tenet, the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy sought to resolve the problem of providing
adulterated drugs to the public by placing the burden of prevention on the apothecaries, rather than on
import inspectors, as the Import Drugs Act later did. The ethical tenet focused on the end of the chain of
distribution of an adulterated drug, rather than the beginning. It also addressed the problem of domestic
adulterated drugs as well as foreign ones, since it did not draw a distinction between the two in its sales
prohibition.90 In this way, Philadelphia code provided broader protection to the public than the Import
Drugs Act did because it could prevent all adulterated drugs—not just drugs imported after passage of
the Act—from reaching patients. Even adulterated drugs that slipped past federal inspectors could be
intercepted by the apothecaries—thereby saving the public from their harmful eﬀects. Through this ethical
tenet, the profession of pharmacy indicated its recognition of the problem of adulterated drugs, and that the
profession could play a role in resolving the problem.
89Ethics Code, at 7th Tenet.
90See infra pp. 42-43 for a discussion of the decision not to address domestic drug adulteration through the Import Drugs
Act.
22The Ethics Code was an incomplete solution to the problem, however, and could not be counted on to prevent
adulterated drugs from reaching the public. First, it was unclear what sort of punishment apothecaries faced
by violating this tenet and intentionally selling adulterated drugs. Second, it was unclear how violations of
the tenet would be discovered, as success of the tenet was dependent upon self-policing by apothecaries or
upon observant and vocal customers. For these reasons, there was little incentive for individual apothecaries
to follow the code. Individual apothecaries may have realized that, in the aggregate, following the tenet
would be better for the profession, but individually, an apothecary could make money more quickly by
selling adulterated drugs. Finally, the tenet was worded so that it would be very diﬃcult to violate. It
focused on the intention of the selling apothecary, which greatly decreased the amount of adulterated drugs
that would be prevented from reaching the public. The apothecary would be guilty of violating the code
only if he intentionally sold the impure drug from motives of competition or desire of gain. Moreover, to
violate the tenet also required that pure drugs of the same type had to be available to the apothecary. Thus,
an apothecary violated this tenet only if he satisﬁed all of the conditions mentioned: 1) intentional selling;
2) of a known unpure drug; 3) with the intent of making a proﬁt or competing economically; 4) when there
were pure drugs of the same type available to him. According to the language of the statute, if even one of
these conditions were not met, the apothecary would not be in violation of the ethics code, and it would be
acceptable for the impure drug to reach the public. Therefore, the ethical tenet did not provide suﬃcient
incentive for apothecaries to abide by it because 1) it was diﬃcult to actually violate it; 2) no punishment
for violation was speciﬁed; and 3) no mechanism was in place to identify violations.
An ethics tenet promulgated by apothecaries—even if abided by—would not reach the adulterated drugs
dispensed directly by physicians. Thus, the reputations of doctors were still threatened by the problem
23of adulterated drugs. The American Medical Association (the “AMA”) identiﬁed adulterated drugs as a
problem at its very ﬁrst annual meeting on May 2, 1848. One of the resolutions presented at this meeting was
that the AMA lobby Congress to pass “a law against the importation and sale of adulterated, deteriorated,
and misnames drugs.”91 The AMA’s lobbying took the form of submitting a memorial to Congress urging
it to appoint inspectors at major ports of entry to the U.S. to examine imported drugs and medicines.92The
memorial read:
The memorial of the American Medical Association, consisting of
delegates from the several States in the Union, at their annual meeting in Balti-
more, assembled May, 1848, respectfully represent:
That it has become notorious among druggists, apothecaries and
physicians that, of late, important drugs and medicines are specially adulterated
in foreign countries, for sale in this, and pass daily through the custom house, to
be disseminated by ignorant and unprincipled dealers, to the great detriment of
our citizens.
That, believing Congress possess the power to enact laws to prevent
the evils complained of, by subjecting all drugs and medicines to the inspection of
persons duly qualiﬁed, whose duty it shall be to ascertain their real value, character
and strength, and to keep such records as will guard the honest dealer against
imposition, your memorialists, therefore, ask your honorable body that a law be
enacted, embracing the appointment of a proper inspector, at each chief port of
entry, whose duty it shall be to examine all imported drugs and medicines, and to
keep a record of such inspections, including the names of the parties, which shall
be open for consultation to druggists and apothecaries and others concerned’ or
to adopt such other measures as, in your wisdom, you may deem best adapted to
prevent the evils complained of; and your petitioners will ever pray.
Signed, Alexander H. Stephens, of New York, president; Alfred Stille, of
Pennsylvania, and H.J. Bowditch, of Boston, secretaries.93
91Minutes of the First Annual Meeting of the American Medical Association, Baltimore MD, May 2, 1848.
92F.J.Blasigame, American Medical Association, 1846-1958 Digest of Oﬃcial Actions of the American Medical Association
177 [hereinafter AMA Digest]. A “memorial” was the term for a petition or prayer to Congress to take some sort of action.
24The AMA’s support of the Import Drugs Act demonstrates the recognition by the group that it was better
to act to correct the problem of drug adulteration in small steps rather than not at all. The AMA could
have waited to give its support to a law that would have gone after all adulterated drugs, rather than simply
the imported ones.
Other actions by the AMA indicated that it viewed regulating only imported drugs as insuﬃcient. In May
1849, a year after the passage of the Import Drug Act, the AMA appointed two delegates from each U.S.
state “to note facts on adulteration of drugs,” and “commended the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy on its
intention to publish ‘instructions for detecting adulterations in medicine.”’94In May 1850, the AMA House of
Delegates passed resolutions recommending: 1) that states appoint boards of examiner who would examine
drugs sold in stores; 2) that druggists work against “fabrication and sale of inferior and adulterated drugs”;
and 3) that the AMA appoint a committee of state representatives to “collect information on spurious and
adulterated drugs.”95Finally, in May 1853, the House of Delegates “approved appointment of a committee
‘to report on the best mode of preventing the domestic adulteration of drugs.”96This demonstrated clear
acknowledgment that adulteration of drugs was not merely a problem of imports, but was a problem in the
domestic market as well.
....
94AMA Digest, at 177.
95Id. at 177-178.
96Id. at 178.
25The health professions’ ﬁght against adulterated drugs represented much more than concern for public health
and safety. Certainly, many doctors and pharmacists were worried about the risks that adulterated drugs
posed for their patients. However, adulterated drugs posed a concurrent risk to the reputation, and perhaps
even the existence, of the professions themselves. At a time when traditional physicians were ﬁghting to
convince patients that they could cure them, adulterated drugs acted as an additional challenge. Traditional
physicians believed in the eﬃcacy of their treatments, and adulterated drugs tended to undermine this
eﬃcacy.
26Chapter 3:
The Proposal and Passage of the Import Drugs Act
“The cool-blooded, deliberate, studied, and fatal deception practised in articles designed for
the relief of suﬀering and disease, can admit of no palliation—can ﬁnd no excuse.”97
Congress began considering the issue of adulterated drugs in January, 1848.98To analyze the issue more
completely, it appointed a Select Committee on the Importation of Drugs (the “Committee”) to hold hearings
and conduct research on the issue. The Committee was made up of Congressmen with experience in the
medical ﬁeld, and was headed by Representative Thomas O. Edwards of Ohio.99 Edwards was a well-
respected medical doctor who took his duties on the Committee very seriously. After quite a bit of research,
the Committee presented House Report 664 (the “Committee Report”) to Congress on June 2, 1848, and
advocated strongly for the passage of House Bill 524, which was to become the Import Drugs Act.
In this chapter, I look at the legislative history of the Import Drugs Act and the social conditions that
prompted it. First, I describe the problem of adulteration in imported drugs and the reasons why foreign
97H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 23 (1848).
98The House and Senate began receiving petitions on the matter of adulterated drugs beginning in January, 1848. See e.g.,
Journal of the Senate for 1848, at 140.
99See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 1.
27drug manufacturers were shipping adulterated products to the United States. I then look brieﬂy at the
communities that turned Congress’s attention to the matter, and describe how the Committee determined
that House Bill 524 was the best solution to the problem of adulterated drugs. I continue with a discussion
of the policy reasons the Select Committee marshaled in support of the bill, and close with an analysis of
the debate regarding the bill on the ﬂoors of the House and Senate.
The Problem of Adulterations in Imported Drugs
To demonstrate to Congress what exactly the problem was, the Select Committee catalogued a long list of
common adulterations in imported drugs. The “blue mass pill,” for example, which contained 33 1
2 percent
mercury when pure, was imported and sold with only 7 1
2 percent mercury.100The rest of the pill, according to
the chemical analyses of a pharmacy professor, was made up of 27 percent clay, 16 percent water, 34 percent
“soluble saccharine matters,” 12 percent “insoluble organic matter,” and trace percentages of coloring and
sand.101 Sulphate of quinine, derived from Peruvian bark, was adulterated by being combined with chalk,
plaster of Paris, and the salts of willow bark.102The Committee Report referred to instances of exporters
removing the medicinal nature of a substance before exportation. For instance, before sending opium to
America, foreign exporters would extract “the morphine or vital principle” from it.103Imports of scammony,
another drug, “contain[ed] generally only about one-half the active principle of the genuine article.”104The
100Id. at 7.
101Id.
102Id.
103Id. at 6.
104Id.
28rest was “a worthless vegetable extract comingled with clay.”105Finally, deliberate adulteration was not
the only problem with imported drugs. Poor shipping conditions often led to a product that was much
deteriorated by age when it arrived in the United States.106Page after page of the Committee’s report
described how various common drugs were imported in adulterated or worthless states.107 The proportion
of imported drugs that were adulterated also was of interest to the Committee. A Customs inspector from
the Port of New York reported that prior to passage of the Act, “more than one half of many of the most
important chemical and medicinal preparations, together with large quantities of crude drugs, come to us
so much adulterated, or otherwise deteriorated, as to render them not only worthless as a medicine, but
often dangerous.”108This indicated to the Committee that the problem was incredibly widespread, and that
action taken on this issue would aﬀect a large amount of drugs. Imports of drugs were in the thousands
and hundreds of thousands of pounds at the port of New York, and if over half of them were adulterated,
an action by Congress here could be worthwhile.109 Imported drugs were adulterated in a variety of ways,
but always with the motive of proﬁt. The Committee was concerned that spurious drugs were being sold at
higher prices than they were worth. Here, the economic concerns, rather than the safety, of the American
people were persuasive to Congress. In its report, the Committee painted a horriﬁc picture of “worm eaten
and decayed” rhubarb, of opium mixed with “Spanish liquorice paste” and “infested with living worms,” and
of an imitation castor compound made up of “dried blood, gum ammoniac, and a little real castor.”110After
being purchased at American ports, these inferior products would be mixed with other substances to disguise
105Id.
106Id. at 3-5.
107See generally, id. at 3-13.
108Id. at 9.
109Id.
110Id. at 4-5, 11.
29their poor quality, before being sold to the general public.111What was emphasized along with the viscerally
disturbing images of worms, was that the deteriorated rhubarb and impure opium were sold at prices that
implied that they would have a medicinal eﬀect.112The Committee admitted that often the price charged
for a deteriorated product would be less than that charged for a pure or fresh product, but still expressed
outrage that such products could be sold at all, when the medicinal eﬀect they would have would be minimal
at best.113 The treatment of the source of quinine presented another example of this economic adulteration.
The Committee described how Peruvian bark “comes to us in large quantities entirely unﬁt for medicinal
purposes.”114The inferior bark “is eagerly bought up at auction sales by unprincipled drug dealers, and
sent to the drug mills, where it is ground and powdered, the color, smell, and natural taste imitated, and
afterwards sold to country dealers and others as a good article.”115Good quality Peruvian bark commanded
30 to 40 cents per pound at its place of production, but the bark coming through the United States ports
was invoiced at only 2 to 7 cents per pound because of its poor quality.116According to the Committee, even
this low price was “justly...considered very dear.”117
111Id. at 5.
112See e.g., id. at 4, 6.
113See e.g., id.
114Id. at 4. Peruvian bark, also known as cinchona bark, or Jesuits’ bark, is the source from which sulphate of quinine
is derived. It grows wild only in the jungles of Peru, and became very valuable due to the limits placed o the supply when
the Peruvian government prohibited exportation of the bark. Gradually, some of the trees were smuggled out of the country,
and plantations of the trees were started in Sri Lanka and Java. See Alfred Burger, Understanding Medications, available at
http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/gen001.htm.
115H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 4.
116Id.
117Id.
30American Markets as Targets for Foreign Drug Manufacturers
The fear that the United States was becoming the only market allowing the importation of adulterated
drugs was one of the primary motivating factors of the Act. The Committee concluded that America “had
become the grand mart and receptacle of all the refuse merchandise of [adulterated drugs], not only from the
European warehouses, but from the whole Eastern world.”118In its report, the Committee made reference
to the laws existing in Europe at the time that allowed the sale only of “genuine articles” of drugs and
medicines.119In the view of the Select Committee, these laws had not stopped the production of the inferior
drugs in Europe; rather, the European manufacturers now looked to the United States as the only market in
which to sell their goods.120This conclusion was based on the increasing amount of European drug imports
over “a long series of years.”121
Indeed, by 1848, a number of European nations had already passed laws regulating the quality of drugs that
could be sold within their borders. As of 1803, France had a law requiring at least one annual inspection of
pharmacies, wholesale druggists, and spicers.122Inspections were conducted by groups drawn from medical
and pharmacy schools, or by doctors and pharmacists.123A member of the police force would accompany
the inspector, and the group had the authority to seize inferior drugs and to impose sanctions.124France
118Id. at 3.
119Id.
120See id.
121Id.
122Alex Berman, Drug Control in Nineteenth-Century France: Antecedents and Directions, in supra note 2.
123Id. at 9.
124Id.
31updated this legislation in 1851 when it passed a new law penalizing those who sold adulterated food or
drugs.125 England also had laws preventing the sale of inferior drugs, which led the Committee to conclude
that London was dumping its low quality drugs on the United States.126According to the report, the largest
proportion of imported adulterated drugs came from England.127The report concluded that
it is but reasonable to suppose that large quantities of crude drugs, of a greatly
deteriorated and inferior quality, must necessarily be constantly accumulating in
[London’s] warehouse, which, on account of the long existing laws of that coun-
try, cannot ﬁnd a home market, and, in consequence, must either be destroyed or
exported to some place where there is no law to prevent their introduction.”128
Thus, a sense of protecting United States citizens from the dangers threatened by the rest of the world, as
well as a desire to have laws as modern as other leading countries, moved Congress to act here.
The Committee Report revealed that foreign sellers of drugs perceived an American demand for adulterated
or inferior drugs.129Foreign drug manufacturers would ship several qualities of drugs to America, priced
according to their varying degrees of purity and strength.130 The manufacturers explained this by saying that
“they must accommodate the demands or lose sales,...as both qualities are ordered in large quantities from
the United States—the genuine article, as they are given to understand, for the seaboard, and the adulterated
for the western trade!”131This implied that customers on the “seaboard,” or Eastern United States, were
willing to pay more for their drugs to receive the genuine article, while those in the western parts of the
country were willing to buy the lower quality drugs because of the lower price. The committee report linked
125Id.
126H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 12.
127Id.at 13.
129Id. at 6-7.
130Id.
131Id at 7.
32the “excessive doses of medicine...prescribed, particularly in the south and west” to the “adulterated agents
prepared expressly for ‘southern and western trade’.”132The report spoke of “incredible quantities” of quinine
being taken in the south and west, “portions of which, if pure, might well startle the eastern and northern
practitioner, and used anywhere would endanger life.”133These large doses of quinine, the Committee Report
claimed, were due not to diﬀerences in climate or disease, but to the inferior quality of the drug.134 The
American demand for adulterated or weak drugs may well have been stimulated by the sales representatives
that foreign drug manufacturers sent to the United States to drum up business. The Committee noted with
furor that diluted quinine was sold under the label of a well respected French drug manufacturer, but was
actually produced in Belgium at an establishment whose “whole business...is to manufacture and dispose
of base imitations of all the important foreign chemical and medicinal preparations.”135The Committee was
further incensed that the Belgian manufacturer had sent a salesperson to the United States to take orders
for the products.136
Foreign catering to a domestic demand for spurious drugs was not the only problem for the Committee. It also
took serious issue with the deceptive labeling of imported drugs. In addition to the quinine mentioned above,
the Committee discussed inferior calomel being sold under “the name of some well known and deservedly
popular manufacturing chemist.”137The Committee expressed outrage on behalf of the consumer for being
duped into buying a worthless product, but also on behalf of the honest manufacturer, whose good name was
being exploited through the deception. With such deception going on, “the label and the mode of package
132H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 18.
133Id. at 18.
134Id.
135Id. at 7.
136Id. at 7-8.
137Id. at 7-8.
33aﬀord[ed] no security to the honest purchaser.”138Thus, inserted into House Bill 524 was a requirement that
all foreign drugs that traditionally came with labels had to be labeled with the name of the manufacturer
and the place of production.139What the Committee thought this would accomplish was unclear, since the
requirement still would not prevent a dishonest importer from putting the name of a reputable manufacturer
on his label.
Though the Committee made much of the economic eﬀect of adulteration on consumers, it quickly dismissed
the economic eﬀect that the bill could have on trade and commerce.140Indeed, there were no questions
about the possible economic impact on trade even during the Congressional debate on the bill.141 Though
it acknowledged the argument that trade and commerce should be unrestricted, and that men “should be
allowed to purchase...[according to] their tastes or interests,” the Committee felt that the issue of adulterated
drugs should be an exception to this rule.142In making its argument, the Committee distinguished medicines
from other goods that were regularly traded freely.143For instance, if an article of clothing from abroad
was defective because it lost its “gloss” or was not warm enough, it could be replaced with a more durable
domestic item. Similarly, if a buyer got a headache from drinking imported alcohol, he could remedy the
situation by not drinking at all.144Yet, with drugs, if the medicine was not of the requisite strength or
purity, the user would run the risk of increased suﬀering or death.145According to the Committee, the risks
138Id. at 8.
139Import Drugs Act of 1848, ch. 70, § 2, 9 Stat. 237, 238 (1848).
140H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 19.
141See infra pp. 49-52 for a discussion of the Congressional debate on the bill.
142Id.
143Id.
144Id.
145Id.
34that a user of adulterated drugs runs were such that economic arguments were not enough to justify their
importation.
Support for Congressional Action against Importation of Adulter-
ated Drugs
The adulteration of quinine was one of the primary public triggers to proposal and consideration of the
bill. As discussed in Chapter 1, the public feared that American soldiers ﬁghting in the war with Mex-
ico were being given adulterated drugs, especially adulterated quinine. The soldiers were reportedly being
given “herculean portions” of medicines, which the Committee attributed to the weakness of the adulter-
ated drugs.146Indeed, according to the Committee Report, the adulteration “accounts for and fully justiﬁes
these seemingly extravagant prescriptions, and also explains the lamentable mortality attendant upon our
troops.”147The Committee appealed to the patriotism of the members of Congress by praising the valor
of the American troops, and suggested that they owed the army a duty of protection from the harms of
adulterated drugs.148As demonstrated in Chapter 1, this issue was more complicated than the Committee
made it seem, as many factors caused the high mortality rate of American soldiers.
Further public support for House Bill 524 and its companion Senate Bill 200 came in the form of several
memorials, or petitions, submitted by various pharmacy and medical organizations, lobbying for passage of
the bill.149The Committee took the memorials and the expertise they represented very seriously. It discounted
146Id.
147Id.
148Id.
149See e.g., the memorial of the American Medical Association in H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 1-2; the resolutions of the
Mississippi Legislature in H.R. Rep. 30-664, at 2; the memorial of the College of Pharmacy of New York in H.R. Rep. No.
30-664, at 2-3; and the memorial of the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy in H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 3.
35the possibility that any selﬁsh motive was driving the medical profession to support this bill.150According to
the Committee Report, “humanity, self-respect, and a just professional pride” had motivated the physicians
to lobby for the bill.151The Committee argued that the public tended to lose conﬁdence in the medical
profession when drugs—due to an adulterated or deteriorated nature—did not function as the physician
predicted.152If the public did not trust physicians, they would be more open to “pretence and quackery” of
pretenders.153Therefore, Congress needed to address the problem of adulterated drugs in order to 1) protect
the good name of the medical profession; and 2) protect the public from being taken advantage of by “men
whose qualiﬁcations give them no claim whatever to either conﬁdence or respect.”154
Congressional action on adulterated drugs was also endorsed by the Treasury Department in a May 25,
1848 letter to the Select Committee.155The Acting Secretary of the Treasury, McClintock Young, declared
that “no doubt is entertained by this department that many valuable lives are sacriﬁced every year by the
importation of adulterated and deteriorated drugs, and that the evil is increasing.”156The Acting Secretary
likened the bill to prevent the importation of adulterated drugs to a law already in eﬀect that forbade the
importation of “all indecent and obscene” images.157Under that 1842 Tariﬀ Act, Customs oﬃcials seized and
150See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 18.
151Id.
152Id.
153Id.
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155Id. at 21-22.
156Id. at 21.
157See Tariﬀ Act of 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566 (1842). See infra pp. 55, 63 for further discussion on the Tariﬀ of 1842.
36destroyed all such imported goods.158That law was “designed to guard against the corruption of the public
morals,” while the proposed drug law was designed, according to the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to
preserve “the lives and health of the community.”159The Acting Secretary felt that the bill before Congress
would “diminish or suppress” the importation of adulterated drugs, and therefore the Department would
“cheerfully and promptly cooperate” with such a law.160Notably, the Acting Secretary did not write that the
bill would succeed in ending the importation of inferior drugs, but only that it would diminish or suppress
the problem. The Committee did not comment on this language in its report to Congress.
The Select Committee Attacks the Problem
In evaluating the problem of adulterated drugs and possible solutions to it, the Committee relied heavily on
the testimony of Dr. M.J. Bailey, a customs examiner from the New York Custom-House. Bailey had served
as the examiner of drugs, medicines, and chemical preparations at the Port of New York since December
3, 1846.161The Secretary of the Treasury asked him to investigate the issue of adulterated drugs for the
Committee.162The Committee clearly thought highly of Bailey, and Bailey clearly thought highly of himself.
The committee report noted that the country and the medical profession “are deeply indebted [to Bailey] for
158See § 28.
159H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 21-22.
160Id. at 22.
161Id. at 8.
162At the time the Import Drugs Act was considered and passed, the United States Customs Service was under the control of
the Department of the Treasury. Thus, the Treasury Secretary had complete control over the day-to-day operations of Customs,
and it was appropriate for the Committee to seek its expertise.
37the ﬁrm and faithful stand he has taken in exposing these frauds.”163Bailey oﬀered his services even before
the Committee summoned his aid, and in a letter to the Committee on April 29, 1848, he praised his own
motives in ﬁghting against adulterated drugs:
I have from the ﬁrst, in aiding the college of pharmacy and my
profession in their appeal, used the knowledge acquired in my present position
with a single desire to advance the general good. Motives of self or pecuniary
interest (had I listened to the prayers of those interested) would have prompted
me to withhold from the public the facts I have willingly disseminated, in order
that permanent beneﬁt might result therefrom. Many an argument have I held
with those who professed to think it no moral wrong, while it was more proﬁtable
to themselves to impose such worthless and dangerous trash upon the community
as we complain of.164
Bailey’s motives likely were noble in that he wanted to keep inferior drugs away from the public. However,
he probably was also spurred by “motives of self or pecuniary interest,” as he was soon appointed the special
examiner for the Port of New York under the Import Drugs Act. Under the Act, the examiner for the Port
of New York received a higher salary than the inspectors at all other ports, and Bailey’s appointment very
likely stemmed from his involvement in the passage of the Act.165 One of Bailey’s tasks was to explain
to the Committee how the Customs Service dealt with imported drugs at the time. He described to the
Committee how Customs inspectors at all the ports had the narrow duty of checking imported cargo to see
that it was priced fairly, and matched the invoice of the ship.166Under this scheme, Bailey, as examiner,
was privy to all kinds of adulterated drugs coming through, yet could do nothing to stop their importation
based on their adulteration. Bailey lamented that “as the law now is, I must pass all such dangerous and
rascally imitations, if they are found to be charged at their full value, and...to be the article speciﬁed in
the invoice.”167As part of his testimony, Bailey also made recommendations to Congress on how to stop
163H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 5.
165See Import Drugs Act, ch. 70, §5, 9 Stat. at 238.
166H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 6.
167Id.
38the importation of adulterated and deteriorated drugs. He asked for a law requiring that all imported drugs
and medicines be examined by customs oﬃcials prior to their acceptance into port.168Only if the drugs were
found to be of good quality, strength, and purity would they be allowed to pass through Customs.169He also
explained the diﬀerence between several types of Customs oﬃcials, so that Congress would know what kind
of appointments to make for the people they chose to evaluate the drugs.170Bailey’s testimony demonstrated
to Congress that it would be a natural extension of the duties of Customs—who was already inspecting
imported goods—to have its inspectors also evaluate the quality of imported drugs.
Congress also had to decide what to do with the drugs that were found to be adulterated by the Cus-
toms examiners. Its options were 1) an “increased duty on the adulterated article” or 2) “condemnation,
re-exportation, or destruction” of the article.171The Committee decided against imposing a higher duty on
adulterated drugs because doing so would still allow the dishonest shippers to make a proﬁt.172The Commit-
tee supported this claim by positing the possible scenario of a foreign shipper who sought to import highly
adulterated rhubarb that was worth virtually nothing medicinally.173If Congress merely imposed a higher
duty on the shipper, traﬃc in adulterated drugs would still occur because the shipper would be able to set a
very low price on the rhubarb, pay the high duty on it, and then sell to an importer at a price that was both
1) lower than the importer would pay for good-quality rhubarb and 2) proﬁtable to the shipper.174Thus,
168Id. at 14.
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170Bailey distinguished among inspectors, examiners, and appraisers. Congress likely chose to appoint “special examiners”
because examiners were the Customs oﬃcials who scrutinized the contents of packages, to ensure that they were priced according
to their actual value. Under the Import Drugs Act, the special examiners of drugs would also be scrutinizing the contents of
packages to ensure that they met a certain quality level. See id. at 14.
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39raising the duty “would be compounding with villainy.”175 For this reason, the Committee chose to prevent
adulterated drugs from entering the United States by having Customs seize or re-export the goods.
The Committee was concerned with determining how and if a law prohibiting the importation of adulterated
drugs would aﬀect the domestic drug market. The Committee quizzed Dr. Bailey on whether “the domestic
manufacturer [would] be induced...the more readily to the preparations of similar [adulterated] articles” if
it prohibited the importation of adulterated drugs.176Bailey’s response was that “by no means” would do-
mestic drug producers be spurred to ﬁll the void of adulterated drugs.177According to Bailey, once foreign
adulterated drugs were removed from the market, the “regular trade” of drug purchasers and consumers
would quickly identify any adulterated drugs as domestic and would trace them back to their source.178He
believed that once the domestic producers of adulterated drugs were revealed, the producers would suﬀer
a loss of reputation, and would be driven out of business.179He also recommended that Congress allow the
states to enact their own laws to combat domestic drug adulteration.180
It seems strange by today’s standards that Congress chose to focus only on foreign adulterated drugs and
not on the domestic adulterated drug market. Feelings of nationalism and widespread xenophobia among
Americans may have inﬂuenced Congress in this decision. Massive amounts of worthless patent medicines
were being produced and sold within America at the time the Act was passed, yet the Committee did not make
reference to this fact.181This willful blindness of the Committee Report may be linked to the pro-America
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181For a discussion of the problem of patent medicines within nineteenth century America, see James Harvey Young, The
Toadstool Millionaires: A Social History of Patent Medicines in America Before Federal Regulation (Princeton Univ. Press
40attitude of the time, exempliﬁed by the idea of “Manifest Destiny.” The 1840’s and 1850’s were the era of
westward expansion in the United States. The country had only just completed the Mexican War, which
gained New Mexico and California, and in 1846, had acquired a portion of Oregon from Great Britain.182The
United States was suspicious in general of Mexicans and other foreigners.183The Committee manifested this
xenophobic attitude in its report through its attribution of maliciousness to foreign shippers who chose to
dump tainted products on America.184 American insularism does not fully explain why Congress did not
attack the problem of domestic adulterated drugs along with the foreign ones. Probably the main reason
that Congress did not address the domestic drug market—though this is not mentioned in the legislative
history—is that in 1848, Congress believed that regulating the domestic adulteration of foods and drugs
was a matter for state and local governments to address. Testimony to the Committee counseled leaving
the domestic problems to the States, who could choose for themselves whether or not to prevent the sale
of adulterated drugs.185Even by 1879, when national regulation of the safety of domestic foods and drugs
was proposed through legislation, Congress did not feel it had the power or the mandate to regulate in this
area.186 Congress also needed to provide for due process concerns in designing the bill. The portion of the bill
allowing an importer to ask for an objective reevaluation of his goods provided the necessary process.187This
section of the bill was modeled on already-existing Customs regulations that allowed an importer to have his
1961).
182The United States and Mexico at War: Nineteenth-Century Expansionism and Conﬂict 146-148 (Donald S. Frazier, ed.,
1999) [hereinafter Expansionism and Conﬂict].
183See generally, id.
184See e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 6, 7, 19, 23.
185Id.at 15.
186For a discussion on the relationship of state law to federal law in the area of adulteration of foods and drugs, see Peter
Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 986-997 (2d ed. 1991).
187See Import Drugs Act, ch. 70, §4, 9 Stat. at 238.
41goods reappraised if he disagreed with their initial valuation.188Under the Customs system existing prior to
the Import Drugs Act, the importer had to pay for the expense of reappraisement of the goods, and then
“two disinterested merchants” would examine and revalue the goods.189Under the Import Drugs Act, an
analytical chemist from outside the Customs Service would examine the goods for adulteration if the foreign
shipper challenged the conclusion of the special examiner.190
The legislative history of the Act oﬀers no hint as to why the drafters of the original bill chose to use the
standards of several international pharmacopoeias, rather than simply the United States Pharmacopoeia.191If
the Committee had chosen the United States Pharmacopoeia as the only standard, the special examiners in
the Customs Service would have had to master just that standard for the several hundred types of drugs that
were imported each year.192Under the Act as passed, however, the special examiners also had to master the
Edinburgh, London, French, and German pharmacopoeia standards for each drug.193One can only speculate
as to why this decision was made. One possible reason is that Congress did not want to completely alienate
its foreign partners in trade, so it chose to mediate the eﬀects of the Import Drugs Act by using foreign as
well as domestic standards for drug quality. Another possible reason is that Congress recognized that the
188H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 14.
189Id. at 14.
190Import Drugs Act, §4.
191See id. at §3. Standardized pharmacopoeias were adopted by many countries in the early nineteenth century. The United
States Pharmacopoeia was adopted in 1820 by the National Medical Convention. The U.S. Pharmacopoeia was composed of
a list of materia medica available to make medicines, instructions for apothecaries for making drugs, as well as “brief notes
indicating the readiest means for ascertaining [drugs’] genuineness and purity.” See Glenn Sonnendecker, “Controlling Drugs
in the Nineteenth Century,” in Safeguarding the Public, supra note 2, at 97, 103-104.
192For a list of common drugs of the 1840’s and 1850’s, see generally C.H. Peirce, M.D., Examinations of Drugs, Medicines,
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193Import Drugs Act, §3.
42ﬁeld of medicine was an art as well as a science, and felt that the standards of other nations could be as
good or better than the standards of the United States. Whatever the rationale, the Committee’s choice to
use multiple pharmacopoeia ensured that the job of special examiner would be extremely demanding.
Policy Arguments Favoring Passage of the Bill
The Committee appealed to several potent policy arguments in urging Congress to pass the legislation. At-
tempting to attract votes for the bill, the Committee alerted the members of Congress that they were also
consumers of the very same drugs that were imported daily.194Realizing that the medicines they relied on
to preserve the health of themselves and their families were worthless or even tainted may have prompted
more than a few aﬃrmative votes on the bill. The Committee report reminded Congress that “no one is
exempt from attacks of disease,” and that “soon or late all mankind need the aid of medicine.”195The drugs
listed as routinely adulterated in the committee report (opium, quinine, blue mass bill, calomel, iodine,
and several others) were just the drugs that most likely were regularly taken by the Congressmen and their
families.196These were not obscure drugs, but ones that were readily available from any apothecary, with
or without a prescription.197As the Committee Report noted, “there are but few of us who have not stood
beside the beds of sick friends, and watched with anxiety the professional attention of the physician; and we
194H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 22.
195Id.
196See generally, id.
197See generally, Taking Your Medicine for information regarding the easy availability of drugs to the public in the nineteenth
century.
43have staked our conﬁdence and our all on the curative agents administered.”198Congress and the public at
large believed in the curative eﬀect of medicines. In passing the Import Drugs Act, Congress would help to
ensure that this faith in medicine was justiﬁed—both for their constituents and for themselves.
Tied to the fear that all Americans (including Congressmen) faced danger from taking adulterated drugs
was the fact that adulterations in drugs were extremely diﬃcult for the consumer to detect. As the com-
mittee report noted, “a very limited number [of people] are qualiﬁed to detect frauds in medicine.”199Even
doctors could not reliably identify adulterated medicines—to require this to would mean that each doctor
must also be an analytical chemist and have his own chemical laboratory.200Thus, patients were powerless to
stop themselves from consuming an adulterated drug because they could not recognize adulterations. Even
worse, patients could not rely on their trusted physicians to guarantee that the drug they prescribed was safe
and eﬀective. The Committee Report hinted that a layman could not be trusted to make his own evaluation
of quality here; because of the undetectability of most adulterations to the average person, experts should
shoulder the duty of evaluating the drugs.
The Committee appealed to broad social concerns in making its case for passage of House Bill 524. According
to the Committee, Congress should address the issue of imported adulterated drugs because doing so would
be acknowledging a duty to “protect...health and life” and advancing civilization as a whole.201The Commit-
tee made the novel argument that because all male citizens had the right to make their voices heard through
voting, the government owed these citizens the duty to protect their “health and life.”202Interestingly, the
Committee made this argument about voting citizens, who were all male, and did not mention a parallel
198H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 22 (emphasis added).
199Id. at 22.
200See id.
201H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 16.
202Id. at 16.
44need to protect non-voting (female and non-white) citizens. According to the Committee Report, as the
rights granted to citizens increased, so did the government’s obligation to protect its citizens’ health.203The
Committee acknowledged that this was a somewhat paternalistic idea of government, yet praised the govern-
ments of Europe who had already passed laws protecting the public health of their citizens.204The Committee
compared the United States government to the governments of European nations with sanitary codes on
their law books, almost in a competitive way, as if Congress should be motivated to pass this bill in order
to keep up with the legislation of other nations.
Yet the Committee did not rely solely on a competitive instinct by Congress to achieve passage of the bill.
It dug much deeper, and suggested that
the impulse to protect from, and to alleviate, disease in other, springs from a higher
source—it ﬂows from the fountain of man’s moral nature, from that higher, holier
feeling which prompts us all to do good to our fellows—from that philanthropy
which makes every man our brother—his suﬀering and his health, no only our
solemn trust and charge, but our pleasurable duty and care.205
The Committee Report went on to praise all that the medical profession has done for humanity, from
checking the spread of smallpox and plague, to making cholera more bearable to deal with.206Through the
eﬀorts of doctors, “the lives of millions [have] been spared for future usefulness.”207By conﬂating prevention
of adulteration in drugs with the human instinct to help others and to save lives, the Committee made it
very diﬃcult for representatives to vote against the bill. For if a Congressman believed the Committee’s
arguments, voting against House Bill 524 would be like voting against the medical profession or against
helping to ease another’s pain. This was a powerful strategy on the part of the Committee—it made voting
203Id. at 16.
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45against their bill seem practically immoral.
The Committee also characterized a vote against the bill as a vote against progress in ﬁghting disease.
After cataloguing the advances of medicine over the years, and describing how medicine had progressed from
“incantation and charms” to “a natural science,” the Committee reminded Congress that all medical advances
were moot if the drugs that doctors prescribed were either dangerous or ineﬀective due to adulteration.208In
overblown language, the committee report argued that “in vain do we push investigation into the laws of
disease; in vain may pharmacy and chemistry point out and provide the curative agency of means, if those
means themselves, through mercenary fraud, are despoiled of their power to heal.”209Thus, according to the
Committee, Congress would be rejecting all medical advances of the past by voting against the House Bill
524.
Finally, the Committee appealed to Congress as a protector of the helpless and the innocent. The committee
report divided the world into two teams: “every man, woman and child, on the one side, and the foreign
fabricator, or dishonest importer, on the other.”210Clearly, Congress was supposed to ally with the honest
men, women, and children of this country—it would be practically immoral for it to back the “foreign
fabricator.” The Committee likened the shippers of adulteration of drugs to “the use of the dagger” or
“passing a counterfeit bill,” from which Congress gladly protected its citizens.211The Committee pointed
out the absurdity of ruling that “to pass a counterfeit bill is a crime, but to pass a counterfeit medicine is
not.”212Thus, Congress would have to be illogical as well as immoral to fail to pass this bill.
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46The Floor Debates on the Bill
The report of the Select Committee on the Importation of Drugs was dated June 2, 1848, and the House
of Representatives passed the House Bill 524 the very same day.213This would seem to indicate that the
Representatives had not had the chance to thoroughly analyze the Committee Report before voting. Indeed,
Representative Hunt’s comments almost presume that Congress had not yet read the report—yet he urged
immediate voting on the bill without debate: “if any discussion were necessary to satisfy the House of the
propriety of passing this bill, [Hunt] would suggest that the able report of the Select Committee should be
read.”214Representative Hunt got what he asked for, as there was virtually no House debate. Only Hunt
and Representative Edwards spoke about the bill before the chamber voted on it. Representative Edwards,
the chairman of the Select Committee on the Importation of Drugs, urged the House to act quickly on the
bill.215He had been informed that foreign drug shippers were aware of the imminent passage of the bill, and
were increasing the amounts of adulterated drugs they were sending to the United States in order to beat
its passage.216In order to catch these vast quantities of adulterated drugs before they entered the country,
Congress needed to pass the bill.217Before urging Congress to vote immediately, Representative Hunt told
Congress that the bill was “of vital importance to [the] country,” and had been examined by “a select
committee of medical men,” who had expertise on the issue.218Hunt appealed to Congress to remedy the
213See Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 810 (1848).
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47problem that had been “very injurious” to the American army during the war with Mexico.219After these
few remarks—and no questions by members of Congress—on the bill, the House voted on and passed the
bill.220
The Senate took up the House bill on June 20, 1848.221There was slightly more debate in this chamber.
Two senators expressed the opinion that the bill would be worthless in preventing adulterated drugs from
reaching the public. Senator Calhoun “expressed his apprehension that the bill could not have the eﬀect of
terminating the evil.”222Senator Dickinson noted that the bill “belonged to that class of legislation which
attempts to put the bell on the cat.”223By this, Dickinson likely meant that while the legislation may have
sounded like a worthwhile solution to the problem of adulterated drugs reaching the public, in practice,
its enforcement would not remedy the problem. He pointed to the large gaps left by the bill, such as the
fact that “the materials would be brought here [to the United States], and the spurious drugs would be
manufactured [here instead of abroad].”224He thought if Congress “could stop the compounding of these
drugs, interdict patients from taking, and physicians from prescribing, [it] might do some good.”225Senator
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223Id. In this statement, Senator Dickinson referenced an old Aesop’s fable, later retold by the Grimm Brothers. In the story,
a group of mice were being regularly terrorized by an old cat who was killing them oﬀ, one by one. The mice got together to
decide how to solve their problem, and numerous ideas were proposed. Finally, the wisest mouse suggested tying a bell on the
cat’s tail, so that the mice would always know where the cat was, and would be able to avoid it. This was hailed as a life-saving
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Dickinson’s analogy to this fable holds only at a broad level—meaning that like the bell on the cat, the Import Drugs Act
sounded like a solution to the problem, but would not work in practice.
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48Dickinson demonstrated through his comments that he recognized that the adulteration of drugs was a
serious problem, but felt that this bill was not the way to solve it.
The defenders of the bill were led by Senator Dix. His comments focused on the severity of the problem.
He “thought it the duty of Congress to take some steps to terminate the evil,” although “he did not know
whether Congress had power to put an end to the evil.”226In essence, Dix’s comments point to a feeling that
Congress had to do something about the awful problem, even if what they did was an incomplete solution.
For Dix, achieving partial success was better than achieving no success. The Senator refused to put resolution
of the problem on the backs of doctors, because “the physician seldom compounds the medicine, and cannot
always detect what is spurious, as the compounding is left to the apothecary.”227Other defenders of the bill
relied on the endorsement that medical experts had given it.228 Like Dix, they focused on “diminishing” the
problem, rather than solving it.229Senator Davis of Massachusetts said that “if we can stop the importation
of the spurious drugs from abroad, we shall know how to deal with those who may choose to go into their
adulteration in the United States.”230And with that, the bill was passed.231
Considering all the ramiﬁcations of this bill, it is quite shocking that Congress debated so little on this bill.
The Import Drugs Act had the potential to aﬀect American relations with other countries as it limited imports
by certain foreign manufacturers. It would aﬀect American businesses as well, speciﬁcally those merchants
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49who regularly purchased the inferior drugs from abroad. There were no questions from Congressmen on
which standards of drugs to use, on what would be done with drugs condemned as adulterated, on what
the qualiﬁcations of the special examiners would be. In the end, the bill passed, and it seems that Congress
satisﬁed itself that minimizing the problem of adulterated drugs was the best it could do at the time. It
remained to be seen how the implementation of the Act would play out.
50Chapter 4:
The Implementation of the Import Drugs Act of 1848
Once the Import Drugs Act passed Congress in June of 1848, the easy part was over. The Act had sailed
through Congress with almost no debate, but as of July of 1848, the United States Customs Service had
to put the Act into eﬀect.232This would require a great deal of work, especially on the part of the special
examiners who were hired to inspect all imported drugs. The Act brought together the Customs Service and
the medical profession together in a new way. The special examiners working for Customs had to have enough
training and education to be able to determine if the drugs they scrutinized met the deﬁnition of adulterated
or spurious. They had to be masters of tests to ferret out adulterations and possible deterioration. They
had to be familiar with the whole pharmacopoeia of drugs. With these heavy task before it, the Customs
Service set out to end the importation of adulterated drugs.
In this chapter, I examine the state of the Customs Service at the time the Act was passed, and question
whether the agency was prepared to deal with the responsibility of enforcing the Act. I describe the public
response to the passage of the Act, and then lay out the mechanics of how the Customs Service implemented
the Act. I close the chapter with an analysis of the short-term success of the Act in identifying and
condemning adulterated drugs.233
232On July 8, 1848, the Secretary of the Treasury sent a “circular” to all ports of entry advising the Customs Service of the
Import Drugs Act, and providing instruction for compliance. See Thomas O. Edwards, Operation of the Law to Prevent the
Importation of Adulterated Drugs, &c., H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 30-43, at 3 (1849) [hereinafter Operation Report].
233This paper seeks to situate the passage of the Act in an historical context, and to look only at its immediate results. As
such, the long-term eﬀects of the Act and the ways in which the Act interacted with later laws are beyond its scope.
51The U.S. Customs Service in 1848
The United States Customs Service did not have a very strong reputation at the time Congress passed the
Import Drugs Act. During the 1800’s, Customs was extremely politicized, with its oﬃcers turning over with
each change of administration.234One gained a lucrative appointment to a job in the Customs Service by
professing party loyalty and by cashing in on family and political connections.235When the administration
shifted from Whig to Democrat in 1853, there were 27,000 applications for approximately 700 positions in the
New York customhouse.236From the mid-1830’s to the mid-1840’s, the Customs Service had been rocked by
scandals of embezzling Collectors. The Collector of the Port of New York, a political appointee of President
Jackson, made oﬀ to London in 1838 with an estimated $1 million dollars, which he had skimmed from the
Customs pot during his tenure.237Cartoons from the 1830’s and late 1840’s revealed the taint of scandal
surrounding the Customs Service, and implied that its oﬃcers could be bought oﬀ to get around the laws.238
Relying on the Customs Service to examine imported drugs was an interesting way for Congress to attack the
problem of adulterated drugs. When the Import Drugs Act was proposed in 1848, the duties of the Customs
Service included collecting tariﬀs on imported goods, which was primarily an economic task. With its new
234Carl E. Prince & Mollie Keller, Dept. of the Treasury, The U.S. Customs Service: A Bicentennial History 106 (1989)
[hereinafter Bicentennial History].
235Id. at 106. For a discussion of the corruption permeating the United States Customs Service during the 1800’s, see id. at
95-106.
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237Id. at 100-102.
238See, e.g., id. between 158-159: “Caricature following New York customhouse scandals, 1838. Library of Congress” depicting
two subtreasurers embracing and praising each other for their corruption; and “Customs heads roll with the changing of the
guard, 1848-1849. Library of Congress” depicting a line of men from the Custom House being guillotined.
52responsibilities under the Import Drugs Act, Customs would play a greater role in determining the quality
and acceptability of imported goods. The only model Customs had to follow in this genre of legislation was
the 1842 Tariﬀ Act.239This 1842 law forbade the importation of obscene materials, so Customs oﬃcials had
to condemn any they found in their inspections.240The Import Drug Act demanded more, however, in that
it required a Customs oﬃcial to conduct scientiﬁc tests to determine if a drug was of the requisite strength
and purity to enter the country. With obscene material, Customs probably did not have to conduct any
identifying tests, as its oﬃcials likely “kn[ew] it when [they] s[aw] it,” much as Justice Potter Stewart did
more than one hundred years later when he deﬁned obscenity.241
Along with the corruption that plagued it, the Customs Service was in poor organizational shape at the
time of the passage of the Act. It was underfunded and understaﬀed, having grown immensely in the
preceding 20 years.242Its organizational structure, however, had not changed with it. In June of 1848, the
entire Customs Service was still under the aegis of the Secretary of the Treasury, who was theoretically
responsible for familiarity with all goings on of the thousands of employees and seizures of the Service.243As
imports and exports skyrocketed, and the number of points of entry to the United States exploded, the
239See Tariﬀ Act of 1842, ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566. The Secretary of the Treasury explicitly compared the two laws in his
letter to Congress supporting legislation prohibiting the importation of adulterated drugs. See H.R. Rep. 30-664, at 4.
240The section of the Tariﬀ Act of 1842 that banned importation of obscene materials provided:
And be it further enacted, That the importation of all indecent and obscene prints, paintings, lithographs, engravings, and
transparencies is hereby prohibited; and no invoice or package whatever, or any part thereof, shall be admitted to entry, in
which any such articles are contained; and all invoices and packages whereof any such articles shall compose a part, are hereby
declared to be liable to be proceeded against, seized, and forfeited, by due course of law, and the said articles shall be forthwith
destroyed.
See Tariﬀ Act of 1842, § 28.
241See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.).
242See Bicentennial History, at 96-98.
243Id. at 97.
53Customs Service was in dire need of a leader who could devote his full time to the job. Finally, in 1849,
the position of Commissioner of Customs was created by Congress, thereby relieving the Secretary of the
Treasury of his control.244The Commissioner of Customs had the direct responsibility for the day to day
administration of Customs and for its “ﬁscal integrity.”245 As mentioned above, the number of points
of entry into the United States was increasing with each new addition of territory to the nation. However,
the vast majority of all good imported into the United States came through the Port of New York. As of
1829, the Port of New York supervised two thirds of all imports into the United States.246As thousands of
pounds of drugs and medicines were among this tally, this port in particular faced challenges in implementing
the Import Drugs Act.247In addition to having a large amount of import/export traﬃc, the Port of New
York was known as a hotbed of corruption within the Customs Service. Indeed, “the volume of goods
passing through that harbor and the dynamic increase in customs personnel simply magniﬁed the corruption
possible in [New York].”248One commentator later described the problems at the Port of New York during
the 1830’s and 1840’s as an “unredressed major national dilemma.”249 These problems notwithstanding,
the Customs Service did have ample experience in enforcing controversial or unworkable laws. Several times
before, Congress had passed laws over great public outcry, making it very diﬃcult for Customs to enforce
them on an angry and resistant populace.250There are numerous accounts of Collectors, the head Customs
oﬃcials at each port of entry, simply refusing to enforce the embargo, due to the public sentiment of their
244Id.
245Id. at 99.
246Id. at 100.
247See H.R. Rep. No. 30-664, at 9.
248Bicentennial History at 95.
249Id. at 96.
250During the 1800’s, the Customs Service had already struggled to enforce the unpopular Embargo Act of 1807 and the Tariﬀs
of 1828 and 1832. See id.at 72-86 for a discussion of this topic.
54communities and to the practical impossibility of complying with the law. Congress also had the habit of
not appropriating enough money to enforce its laws—often there were not enough Customs oﬃcers on the
payroll to handle the burgeoning number of imports and exports.251As will be discussed later in this chapter,
Congress simply added to this problem with its passage of the Import Drugs Act. When Congress did not
provide enough resources to accomplish its objectives, there was little the Customs Service could do.
Thus, by the time the Act was passed in June of 1848, there were already certain expectations of how
Customs operated—expectations held by Congress, the Customs Service, by importers and exporters, and
by the public at large. In the years prior to 1848, the Customs Service “had...found itself understaﬀed
and underﬁnanced, yet compelled to bear the brunt of enforcing badly drawn legislation.”252Circumstances
would not change with the passage of the Import Drugs Act. The stain of corruption was still very much
associated with the Customs Service. Though it may be going too far to say that importers regularly
expected to bribe Customs oﬃcials to reduce their import taxes, or to get suspicious goods smuggled in, it is
undoubtedly the case that all parties involved in importation or exportation knew that bribery was always
an option.253Given the corruption, poor organization, and underfunding of the Customs Service in 1848, it is
unclear how Congress honestly could have expected the agency to stop the ﬂow of adulterated foreign drugs.
251Id.
252Id. at 94.
253See, e.g., Nathaniel Hawthorne’s description of his co-workers at the Salem Customhouse, who diligently went about
impounding ships after a large amount of goods were already smuggled ashore. Id. at 111.
55Public Response
The response of the public to the passage of the Import Drugs Act was diverse. According to Dr. T.O.
Edwards, who toured Customhouses to review compliance with the Act, “no bill ever met with more decided
opposition on its introduction than the act of the 26th of June last.”254Edwards noted that, “Many com-
mission houses and drug brokers attacked it, with a violence unexpected by its friends; while one or more
leading commercial journals in New York, for weeks before the passage of the law, devoted large space to its
attack, and after their arguments had been answered, resorted to abuse of its authors and friends.”255Such
abuse was not entirely unwarranted, as the import community had good reason to protest the Act. Drug
importers stood to lose a great deal of business if the goods they hoped to buy and sell were condemned
by Customs. Other participants in the drug market were less resistant to the Act. The Collector at the
New York Custom House claimed to be “credibly informed that regular dealers in drugs express themselves
satisﬁed that the law is a necessary and beneﬁcial one, and absolutely necessary to the prevention of injustice
and injury to the community.”256
Other constituencies expressed their happiness that Congress had passed the Import Drugs Act. Unsurpris-
ingly, the medical community was especially pleased. The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal lauded the
Act’s passage on July 12, 1848.257The journal thanked the National Medical Association (which became the
254Operation Report, at 2. As the reader will remember, Dr. Edwards headed the Select Committee on the Importation of
Drugs, and had been the strongest proponent for the passage of the Act.
255Operation Report at 2.
256Id.at 3.
257Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, July 12, 1848.
56AMA) for helping to stop the “death-destroying traﬃc in adulterated drugs” by lobbying for the Act.258Dr.
Edwards was praised for his work on the Act by a resolution of the New Hampshire Medical Society at its
annual meeting on June 5, 1849.259
Enforcement Mechanics
Enforcement of the Import Drugs Act began on July 8, 1848, less than two weeks after the Act was passed
by Congress. The Customs Service had to decipher the requirements of the Act, and make decisions about
how to practically comply with it. The most pressing task Customs faced was ﬁnding the special examiners
who would evaluate all drugs coming into the ports. Customs also had to ﬁnd equipment and space for
testing the drugs, as well as ﬁgure out how and where to destroy the drugs that were condemned. In this
section of the chapter, I look at the decisions Customs made in interpreting the Act, and describe some of
the mechanics of how the Act was implemented.
The special examiners who would analyze all the drugs coming through the ports of entry were the key
element to the Act’s success. As such, honesty and devotion to the job were important characteristics needed
in the examiners. To ensure that the special examiners recognized the heavy weight of their duties, Customs
required them to swear an oath of loyalty to the United States before beginning their jobs.260The examiners
had to swear that they would “diligently and faithfully perform the duties of [the] oﬃce as prescribed by
258Id.
259Minutes of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the New Hampshire Medical Society, June 5, 1849.
260Import Drugs Act, ch. 70, §6, 9 Stat. at 239.
57the act to prevent the importation of adulterated and spurious drugs and medicines, approved June 26,
1848, and w[ould] use [their] best endeavors to prevent and detect frauds upon the revenue of the United
States.”261The examiners also had to swear to “support the Constitution of the United States.”262These
oaths were basically equivalent to the oaths that any Customs inspector had to swear at the time. Given
the corruption inherent in the Customs Service at the time, we have no way of knowing whether the oaths
kept the examiners honest in performing their duties.
Once they assumed their duties, the drug examiners faced diﬃculties likely unanticipated by Congress when
it passed the Act. Even if Congress had considered the issues, it failed to resolve them in the language
of the statute. Drug examiners faced dilemmas over what to do with drugs that were already in storage
at customhouses,263or how to treat cargo that was shipped before the passage of the Act, but arrived at
an American port after the Act’s enforcement had begun.264Congress did not list exemptions to the Act’s
requirements, so the Collectors and the Secretary of the Treasury were left to interpret it themselves. The
parties involved struggled with issues of fairness and the intended eﬀect of the law in making their rulings.
The examiners realized that condemning cargo shipped before the Act went into eﬀect would be like enforcing
an “ex post facto” law, yet failing to condemn the adulterated cargo would have defeated the Congressional
intent of prohibiting adulterated drugs from entering the United States.265These Customs oﬃcials were
261General Regulations under the Customs and Navigation Laws of the United States (1857 ed.) at 160 [hereinafter General
Regulations].
262Id.
263Letter from C.W. Lawrence, Collector at the New York Custom House, to Robert J. Walker, Secretary of the Treasury,
dated July 21, 1848. The letter asks for advice regarding deteriorating rhubarb root in the Customs’ warehouses. [Letter #196
in Hutt Binder].
264Letter from C.W. Lawrence to McClintock Young, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, dated September 11, 1848, asking that
the Secretary exempt from condemnation adulterated drugs shipped before June 26, 1848. [Letter #229 in Hutt Binder].
265Id.
58required to make daily judgment calls, in addition to performing the rest of their demanding duties.
The types of tests conducted by the special drug examiners were numerous and complicated. To test
the strength of various acids, for example, the examiners had to determine the “speciﬁc gravity” of the
liquid, which was done with a hydrometer.266However, one of the examiners describing the process cautioned
that hydrometers were “frequently inaccurate and deceptive instruments” and suggested several ways to
determine the accuracy of the instrument.267Moreover, “accurate determination of the speciﬁc gravity [of
liquids]...[wa]s not very easy for those who are not skilled in manipulating...[the] instruments.268With so
much potential for error in these tests, it is a wonder that importers accepted them as valid when the results
were so determinative of an importer’s proﬁts. Other tests required burning substances, mixing chemicals,
evaporating out precipitates, and making very precise measurements—all of which tasks were extremely time
consuming and demanding.269Testing could take more than a day for some drugs. The special examiner all
by himself was charged with keeping track of all the phases the testing was in, conducting the tests, keeping
266See Examinations, at 5.
267Id. at 5.
268Id. at 5. The complexity and potential for error inherent in the examination processes is demonstrated perfectly by Dr.
Peirce’s description of testing the strength of an acid. After ﬁrst instructing the reader to select a few well-formed crystals of
an alkali substance (e.g., bicarbonate of soda), he went on:
When a test is to be made, reduce some of the crystals to a ﬁne powder, and dry it between a few folds of bibulous paper,
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be slightly reddened by the solution, it indicates that enough acid has been added; it if is not reddened, add a few more drops
of acid, until the desired reaction takes place. Then replace the ﬂask upon the balance, and add weights enough to restore
the equilibrium. This weight of course shows the amount of acid consume in neutralizing 100.5 grains of bicarbonate of alkali,
provided none of the acid has been spilled during the operation. The inexperienced manipulator generally ﬁnds it diﬃcult to
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Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
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59records, and boarding ships to ensure that every single cargo box of drugs or medicines was examined. A
small error in measurement or calculation could result in either the mistaken condemnation of valuable,
genuine drugs, or the erroneous acceptance of a shipment of contaminated or weak drugs.
The Customs Service also had to interpret what Congress intended by providing that imported drugs were
acceptable if they met the standards of ﬁve diﬀerent pharmacopoeia.270Customs regulations provided that
if the drug was manufactured in England, Scotland, France, or Germany, it had to measure up to the
pharmacopoeia standards of the respective country of production.271If the drug had been manufactured
in another foreign nation, it had to meet the standards of the United States Pharmacopoeia.272In this
way, the Customs Service ﬁlled the gaps in the Act as written by Congress, since the Act did not specify
which pharmacopoeia standard to use for any given shipment. The special examiners still had to maintain
knowledge of the current state of all ﬁve pharmacopoeia, however, in order to perform their assigned tasks.
When the examiners found that imported drugs did not meet the standards speciﬁed under the Act, Customs
oﬃcials took certain steps. First, an examination was performed to determined whether any part of the
imported cargo met the strength and purity standards of the Act.273If any parts of the cargo were of
suﬃcient strength and purity, they could be sold and “the proceeds accounted for as in ordinary cases
of forfeiture.”274The adulterated portion of the cargo had to be destroyed. This policy indicated concern
about waste of drugs of adequate quality; though Customs aimed to prevent adulterated drugs from entering
270See supra pp. 44-45, discussing Congress’s decision to include all ﬁve pharmacopoeia.
271See General Regulations at 156.
272Id.
273Id. at 159.
274Id.
60the United States, it did not want to interfere with trade by overcondemning. The same issues had been
faced by Customs with the 1842 Tariﬀ Act that prohibited importation of obscene materials. Customs
oﬃcials were often unsure whether they were supposed to condemn entire shipments of goods, or just the
few obscene articles within them.275It seems that in enforcing the Import Drugs Act, Customs was consistent
in destroying only the adulterated portions of shipments.
Customs oﬃcers also followed certain procedures in destroying the inferior drugs.276The special examiner
had to choose a place and means of destruction, and a customs oﬃcer had to ensure that the drugs were taken
there and destroyed.277Extensive documentation about the shipment had to be kept, including descriptions
of the condemned articles, the name of the importer, the date of shipment, and the name of the ship and the
place of origination.278The Customs oﬃcer had to certify that the goods had been destroyed, and ﬁle the
records in the Custom-house.279These regulations sought to ensure that the adulterated goods actually were
prevented from entering the country. However, given the reputation of Customs at the time, it is impossible
to know whether the certiﬁcations of destruction ﬁled by the oﬃcials were accurate. As bribes were a way
of life in other areas of Customs, they also may have been used by foreign drug manufacturers to get around
the condemnation of their adulterated goods.
Interestingly, the labeling requirements of the Import Drugs Act were treated diﬀerently than the strength
and purity requirements. Under the labeling requirement, Customs appraisers had to see that “the true
name of the manufacturer, and also the place where said articles were prepared, are ‘legibly aﬃxed to each
275See Bicentennial History, at 252-253 for a discussion of the Tariﬀ Act of 1842, and Customs’ relationship to pornography
over time.
276General Regulations, at 162-163.
277Id.
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61parcel by stamp, label, or otherwise.”280But, not all imported drugs required this label: under the Act,
only medicinal preparations “usually imported with the name of the manufacturer, and the place where
prepared, permanently and legibly aﬃxed to each parcel.”281Thus, the labeling requirement touched only a
limited group of imported drugs—those that were regularly labeled with quite a bit of information about
their manufacture. If there were imported drugs missing the required label, the Customs Service would
report the case to the United States district attorney to prosecute.282Customs could not condemn imported
drugs for violating the labeling requirement; only through additional legal proceedings could the drugs be
seized and condemned.283The labeling requirement diﬀered from the strength and purity requirements in
that there are no reports of drugs being condemned for violating the labeling requirement, while there were
large amounts of drugs condemned as adulterated.284
One of the major diﬃculties the Customs Department faced in executing the Import Drugs Act was Congress’
unwillingness to fund it adequately. When Congress passed the Act, it did not appropriate any additional
funds for its implementation. The salaries to be paid to the examiners were to come out of funds “not
otherwise appropriated” in the Customs’ treasury.285The Act speciﬁcally provided that the special examiners
of drugs must come from the existing members of Customs if at all possible.286Any appointment that
280Id. at 159.
281Import Drugs Act, §2 (emphasis added).
282General Regulations, at 159.
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284Nowhere in Congressman Edwards’ report did he mention any drugs being condemned or held back in Customs because of
failure to identify the name and place of origin of the drug. Neither did the proliﬁc Dr. Bailey mention any labeling violations.
See generally, Operation Report.
285Id. at §5.
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62increased the number of employees of the Collection Oﬃce was unacceptable under the Act—if a person
from outside the Customs Service was made special examiner of drugs, then an existing employee of that
Customs Oﬃce had to eliminated.287When the Customs House at the port in Salem, Massachusetts hired
local apothecary G.H. Pinkham as its special drug examiner, presumably it had to eliminate one of its
existing positions, as Pinkham had not previously been employed by the Customs Service.288Congress was
not willing to spend much, if any, money to see that the Act succeeded.
At the time the Import Drugs Act was passed, the Customs Service was on a very tight budget. As noted
earlier, this budget may have been further limited by the embezzling done by many top Customs oﬃcials.
Customs was already engaged in cost-cutting measures, even before passage of the Act. In a letter sent to
all ports in October, 1847, the Secretary of the Treasury had instructed all Custom Houses to limit their
“conﬁdential inspectors” to one per port, to pay the inspectors per diem for each day they could prove
they worked, and that they must not pay these inspectors more than $1200 cumulatively per year.289The
unappropriated monies that Customs was ordered to tap to fund the Act most likely did not exist.
In a way, Congress’s failure to appropriate funds for the Act was in keeping with the practices of the time.
Until June 30, 1849, Customs had to pay its expenses out of the duties it collected, before turning into the
remainder to the Treasury Department.290If Customs’ budget was indeed limited by the amount of duties it
took in, it is clear why opponents of the Import Drugs Act argued that it would end up reducing Customs’
budget. For under the Act, when Customs seized or condemned adulterated drugs, it could not collect duties
on them as it had previously been used to doing. In the Port of New York, where thousands of pounds of
287Id. at §7.
288Bicentennial History, at 121.
289Department of the Treasury, A History of Enforcement in the United States Customs Service, 1789-1875 (1988), at 63-64
[hereinafter History of Enforcement].
290Id. at 64. Congress’s policy toward the Customs Service budget changed with the Act of March 3, 1849, when Congress
provided that Customs would receive appropriations for its activities. Id. at 57.
63drugs were condemned under the Act, Customs surely did lose a substantial amount in duties.
The Success of the Act
I. Edwards’ Report to Congress
The question on everyone’s mind was whether the Import Drugs Act would be successful in reducing the
problem of adulterated drugs. Thus, within months of the passage of the Act, Congress wanted a progress
report.291It asked Dr. T.O. Edwards of the Select Committee on the Importation of Drugs “to visit the ports
of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York and Boston, for the purpose of examination” to determine whether
the Act was “fully and properly carried into eﬀect.”292Edwards’ verdict was that the law was a success, for
“whilst the law in its practical operation has not fulﬁlled the predictions of its enemies, it has more than
realized the anticipations of its friends.”293Edwards based his assessment on interviews with importers in
the cities he visited, as well as the more than six hundred letters praising the Act he said he received.294He
was satisﬁed that as the law was implemented, views on it were becoming more and more positive, and
only “a very limited number now advocate that freedom of trade which gives to the designing and dishonest
drug dealer power not only over the health but the lives of the community.”295The Act was so well-received,
291Operation Report, at 2 (references Oct. 10, 1848 letter from Congress requesting an update).
292Id. (quoting the Congressional request of Oct. 10, 1848).
293Id. at 2.
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64Edwards wrote, that he “was unprepared for so full an expression of its beneﬁts.”296
As part of his evaluation of the eﬀectiveness of the Act, Edwards requested a report from the New York
Custom House. The Collector, who was in charge of the Custom House as a whole, referred Edwards to Dr.
M.J. Bailey, who had been named the special examiner of drugs for the New York Custom House, and who
had been a strong advocate for the bill’s passage a few months earlier.297The Collector did not have records
of imported drugs—adulterated or pure—so had to rely on Bailey for the data. Though he was unaware of
the speciﬁc eﬀects the Act was having on imports in his own port, the Collector demonstrated strong support
for the Act. He addressed complaints that the condemnation of adulterated drugs had led to a reduction
in duties collected by Customs by arguing that the protection to health and safety aﬀorded by the Act
more than compensated for the lost revenue.298The Collector went even further to argue that the Act would
eventually lead to increased revenue to Customs, as more superior quality drugs (with a correspondingly
higher duty to pay) would be imported to ﬁll the gaps of the adulterated drugs.299This type of positive
attitude from a high-ranking member of Customs must have been highly encouraging to Dr. Edwards.
In his report to Congress, Edwards made concrete statements of the amounts of adulterated drugs seized
by Customs in the months since the bill’s enactment. In Boston and in Baltimore, only one shipment had
been condemned in each port.300In Philadelphia, no seizures of adulterated drugs had occurred.301Edwards
explained that the cause of the small number of seizures was the small number of drugs generally imported
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65through these speciﬁc ports and the tendency of importers not to present adulterated drugs at port when
they would necessarily be rejected.302In the Port of New York, however, there were quite a number of seizures
of adulterated drugs pursuant to the Act. Dr. Bailey’s records included thousands of condemned pounds of
jalap root from Mexico, rhubarb root from England, opium from France and England, and cinchona bark from
“Carthagena” (Mexico).303Some of the condemned drugs were “greatly adulterated...and also deteriorated
by age and other causes.”304Others had had their “active properties” removed to make extracts, while the
jalap root was of “spurious or bastard varieties, mixed with a small proportion of the genuine root.”305Of
particular interest, especially in light of the heavy use of quinine by American troops in Mexico, were the
shipments of yellow bark and cinchona bark that were condemned. The condemned was of a “bastard
variet[y] that aﬀord[ed] no quinine and very little if any cinchonine.”306As such, it was “worthless for
medicinal purposes.”307Before the Act, according to Edwards’ letter, such bark would have passed Customs,
been sold at a low price, powdered, and then “sold in large quantities to the unsuspecting for the genuine
article.”308Based on the quantities of drugs condemned in New York, Edwards’ report indicated deﬁnite
progress in preventing adulterated drugs from entering the country.
Though the amount of drugs condemned in New York was substantial, very few of the importers whose
goods were condemned took advantage of the appeal provided for in Section 4 of the Act.309In New York,
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66of the 27 shipments of drugs that were rejected between July 8, 1848 and December 23 1848, only two
appeals occurred.310The condemnation of one of these shipments stood after evaluation by an independent
chemist.311The other appealed shipment of six cases of opium was ultimately split into two parts following
re-evaluation by a chemist.312Four of the cases were still condemned as adulterated and re-exported, but two
of the cases were allowed to pass through Customs after an analytical chemist found “the article genuine
and pure, only of a weak standard of strength.”313As discussed earlier in this chapter in the section on the
mechanics of enforcement, the treatment of this shipment of opium indicated that Customs was consistently
following a policy of condemning only adulterated portions of shipments. Indeed Edwards supported a policy
of allowing the Customs inspector to condemn only the adulterated portion of a shipment, and to allow the
good quality portion to enter the United States.314Such a policy would “rob the enemies of the bill of their
principle objection, and would clearly demonstrate that those opposed to the traﬃc of adulterated drugs
have no desire to trammel legitimate business.”315 Edwards’ report also professed a high degree of support
for the special examiners who labored under the Act. Edwards described them as “qualiﬁed and diligent,”
“determin[ed] to carry [the law] into execution [to] its utmost limit,” and “fulﬁll[ing] the requisition of the
law.”316Given that Customs was known as a place of political connections and corruption at the time, it
is interesting that Edwards placed so much apparent faith in these examiners. Even when telling Congress
that the inspectors at three of the major ports into the United States had condemned only two shipments
310Operation Report at 5.
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67among them over the course of four months, there was no hint of irony in Edwards’ praise of the inspectors’
competence and devotion. Based on his pleasure with the performance of the inspectors, Dr. Edwards
proposed increasing the salary of Dr. Bailey, the special examiner at the Port of New York. Under the Act,
Dr. Bailey was making $1600 per year, which was less than what the ordinary Customs appraisers at the
same port earned for their services.317Edwards was successful in getting Congressional approval for a salary
raise to $2000 per year for Bailey, and also secured funding ($1000 per year) for a clerk to assist the special
examiner.318He justiﬁed the salary raise by pointing out that Bailey had already condemned “a very large
amount” of adulterated drugs, which was Congress’ goal in passing the Act.319Edwards also described the
enormity of Bailey’s job: every single shipment had to be eyed by him—not only eyed, but tested. This was
indeed a huge job for one man, and it is easy to believe Edwards’ claim that Bailey “labored all day in his
oﬃce, and a large part of the night in his laboratory.”320
Taken as a whole, Edwards’ report reveals a number of biases on his part. He had been an ardent supporter
of the bill as it worked its way through Congress, and the language he used to condemn those who opposed
the enforcement of the Act suggests that he may have had certain results in mind when he began his
investigations. Edwards aligned those advocating for “freedom of trade” with dishonesty and murderous
intent, stating that they sought to have power “not only over the health but the lives of the community.”321He
dismissed as mere “murmurings” the unhappiness that some commission houses had regarding the Act,
317Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 2nd Sess., 323 (1849).
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68when these commission houses may have had valid economic arguments.322According to Edwards, these
houses either had foreign interests in mind, or found the “almighty dollar” more important than “the lives
and happiness of their fellow beings.”323This type of language echoed that found in the Committee Report
drafted by Edwards, that aligned non-supporters of the law with evil, greed, immorality, and non-patriotism.
II. Reports of Special Drug Examiners
A few of the special examiners also commented on the results of the Act. These examiners wrote from their
own experiences, and thus their reports come to the reader unmediated. However, the examiners also had
the most at stake in describing the successes or failures of the Act. Their salaries and reputations were on
the line, and if the Act failed to address the problem of adulterated drugs, these examiners were failures as
well. The famous Dr. Bailey of the Port of New York and Dr. C.H. Peirce of the Port of Boston both had
high praise for the Import Drugs Act from their vantage points as special examiners of imported drugs.324
Both Bailey and Peirce found the Import Drugs Act beneﬁcial because it had reduced the amount of adulter-
ated foreign drugs that were presented for importation. Bailey attributed this to the publicity surrounding
the proposal and passage of the Act, which he conjectured had spurred the importers to change their behavior
and cease production of adulterated medicines.325According to Bailey, because the dishonest drug manufac-
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69turers had dropped out of the market, the honest ones were doing increased business.326Peirce asserted that
foreign drug manufacturers were deterred from exporting “fraudulent medicines” to the United States “when
they [we]re aware of the strict examination such medicines must undergo here, with the certainty that they
will be condemned if found to be spurious, or below the appointed standard of purity.”327 Both examiners
also acknowledged that the Act had not touched the problem of domestic drug adulteration. Peirce admitted
that adulterated medicines were indeed manufactured in America, but urged individual states and munic-
ipalities to legislate against this problem.328He was quite satisﬁed that the Act had resulted in increased
public awareness of drug adulteration. Peirce predicted that “on being made aware of the extent to which
this is carried on, they will be cautious of whom they purchase, and will thus indirectly help in carrying out
the provisions of the law.”329Bailey, too, came to admit that medicines were adulterated domestically, and
had changed his mind about the honesty of his fellow Americans by the middle of 1849. In the spring of 1848,
Bailey had told the Select Committee that the Act would not increase—and may even decrease—domestic
adulteration of drugs. However, in his report to the New York Academy of Medicine in June, 1849, he
acknowledged that Americans themselves were adulterating drugs:
To suppose that we have none among us engaged, or who will engage in the
preparation and sale of spurious and adulterated medicines, is to place a higher
estimate upon the conscientious scruples of that portion of our speculating and
trading community with whom the almighty dollar is paramount to all other con-
siderations, moral, if not divine, than, from my somewhat extensive observations,
I am willing to concede.330
Academy of Medicine, June 6, 1849) [hereinafter Bailey Operation Report].
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70Even by June, 1849, “the fraudulent work of [American] hands [wa]s but too visible” for Bailey to ig-
nore.331Bailey asserted that this practice of domestic adulteration of drugs was only “recently transferred to
our shores.”332He was so dead-set against believing that Americans would stoop to adulterating medicines
that he claimed that foreigners had come into America to adulterate the medicines there: “I have good reason
to believe that we have at present those among us from abroad, who have so long been engaged in this partic-
ular line of business, that they have become perfect adepts at this base and deceptive art.”333Unfortunately,
Bailey’s tendency to scapegoat foreigners as the cause of even domestic drug adulteration may have pre-
vented him from making more helpful recommendations to Congress. If examiners such as Peirce and Bailey
had pushed harder for federal regulation of domestic drug adulteration, Americans might not have had to
wait until the 1906 Food and Drug Act for such protections.334
331Id. at 149.
332Id..
333Id.
334The ﬁrst federal law addressing the problem of domestic adulteration of drugs was the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906.
See 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
71Conclusion
As this paper makes clear, numerous factors were involved in the passage of the Import Drugs Act of 1848.
The adulteration of drugs was a severe problem, and there were surely many people who fought for it in order
to protect the health and safety of their fellow man. In this paper, however, I have tried to shine light on
motives or rationales of the Act’s supporters that may not be evident on ﬁrst glance. The self-righteous anger
that the Committee Report expressed at the thought of American soldiers being given adulterated drugs was
tied—consciously or not—to Congress’ need to explain the high mortality rate of American soldiers. The
physicians lobbying for passage of the Act also stood to gain from it—both in status and in income. In the
end, while noble goals certainly played a role in the Act’s passage, so too did the self-interests of the parties
lobbying for and voting on the Act.
In this paper, I have also sought to capture some of the mundane practicalities of implementing the Act.
Congress saddled the Customs Service with a huge task when it passed the Act. The special drug examiners—
primarily the examiner for the Port of New York—had very demanding jobs, especially given the complicated
procedures required to test the drugs for adulterations. The Customs oﬃcials faced the day-to-day disputes
over the quality of a shipment of drugs, and were required to make judgment calls that Congress never
anticipated when it passed the Act. Looking closing at the enforcement procedures of Customs also clearly
revealed that Congress did not provide nearly enough funding for the Act. Catching every single adulterated
drug that came through the Port of New York would have required a decent-sized staﬀ, who could share
72the duties of inspecting, testing, record-keeping, settling disputes, and destroying the condemned articles.
Without adequate funding, the Import Drugs Act could not reach its full potential.
Ultimately, the Import Drugs Act was both a success and a failure at addressing the problem of adulter-
ated drugs. As demonstrated in this paper, the new Customs examiners did condemn large amounts of
adulterated drugs under the Act—drugs that previously would have entered the country and been sold to
the public. In this sense, the Act was successful, as it did reduce the quantity of foreign adulterated drugs
reaching American citizens. However, American citizens were still being sold adulterated medicines—even
after passage of the Act. The Act could not reach domestically-produced adulterated drugs, so was doomed
to failure in this area. If nothing else, the Import Drugs Act revealed how strong the domestic production
of adulterated drugs was. And, more than ﬁfty years later when Congress was debating the 1906 Food and
Drugs, the Import Drugs Act of 1848 may have reminded it that in order to eﬀectively solve the problem of
adulterated drugs, it needed to regulate domestically.
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